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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Protect Marriage Illinois, et al., )
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) No. 06 C 3835
)
David D. Orr, Cook County Clerk, et al., ) MEMORANDUM
) Honorable Elaine B. Bucklo, Judge Presiding
) Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow
Defendants. )
______________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Illinois Election Code 10 ILCS 1-1 et seq. gives the people the ability to petition the Legislature to adopt an advisory question of public policy. ILCS 5/28-1 through 5/28-13. Plaintiff Protect Marriage Illinois (“PMI”) initiated a petition defining marriage for presentation to the voters in the November 2, 2006 general election. The Advisory Question reads: “Shall the Illinois General Assembly submit an amendment to Article IX of the Illinois State Constitution to the voters of the State of Illinois at large at the next General Election stating as follows: ‘To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of children, a marriage between a man and a woman is the only legal union that shall be valid or recognized in this State’?” (Exhibit 1) (“PMI Petition”). In order to be submitted to the voters for their approval or disapproval, the petition must contain signatures of registered voters equaling at least 8% of the votes cast in the last gubernatorial election. ILCS 5/28-9. The signatures must be submitted at least 6 months before the General Election at which the petition is to be submitted and not be circulated more than two years before that election. Id. If the voters approve of the Advisory Question, it may or may not be acted upon by the general assembly. In this case, the PMI petition was required to contain approximately 283,000 signatures. PMI timely filed the Statewide Petition with the State Board of Elections (“SBE”) on May 8, 2006, with approximately 347,000 signatures. (Exhibit 4 of Declaration of Plaintiff David E. Smith.)
Illinois law treats citizen initiated statewide advisory questions and statewide candidate nominating petitions and new party nominating petitions differently. For example, the state requires that each petition sheet for a statewide referendum contain only signatures from registered voters of a single election jurisdiction, and that all the petition sheets for a single jurisdiction be bound together before filing. 10 ILCS 5/28-9. The result of this requirement is that if a person signs the petition on the wrong sheet, his or her signature will “not be counted toward the minimum number of signatures required to qualify the . . . statewide advisory public question for the ballot.” 10 ILCS 5/28-9. This provision alone has resulted in the invalidation of more than 20,000 signatures for the Protect Marriage Illinois referendum. (Exhibit 11.)
The requirement that all signatures on a petition sheet be from a single election jurisdiction does not apply to other kinds of petition efforts in Illinois. For example, signatures on petitions for a new statewide political party or independent statewide candidates for political office or new statewide parties are not limited to sheets with only signatures from the same jurisdiction. 10 ILCS 5/7-10, 10-2, 10-4. Moreover, signatures on petitions relating to public questions for political districts involving more than one election jurisdiction but not statewide, are not limited to sheets with other signatures from the same election jurisdiction. 10 ILCS 5/28-3, 28-5, 28-6, 28-7.
Another regulation that applies only to constitutional amendments and advisory questions of public policy is that each signature on the petition “reasonably compares” with the signature shown on that person’s registration record card.” (10 ILCS 5/28-11(2). There is no such requirement for any other petition effort in Illinois whether it is for statewide political parties or candidates (10 ILCS 5/7-10, 10-2, 10-4), or petitions relating to public questions for political subdivisions (10 ILCS 5/28-3, 28-5, 28-6, 28-7), except a public question initiative submitted pursuant to Const. Ill. 1970, sec. 3, art. XIV. The requirement as applied to statewide advisory petitions, leaves it to the judgment of each election jurisdiction official examining signatures in each of the 115 election jurisdictions to determine what “reasonably compares” might mean.
The SBE deleted approximately 10,000 signatures from the petition because the signature on the petition did not, according to individual election officials in each jurisdiction, “reasonably compare” to the signature on the voter registration card. Another approximately 10,000 signatures were deleted from the petition because they were “out-of-jurisdiction” signatures. Still another 44,000 signatures were deleted as not registered at the address opposite their signature. (Exhibit 11.) The SBE made no attempt to notify any of these voters that their signatures had been stricken. (Exhibits 7, 9 and 10.) The SBE then projected that 91.1% of the total number of signatures on the petition would be valid, (Exhibit 12), which was approximately 3.9% below the 95% validity required. (Exhibit 12.) The SBE then found that the petition was presumptively invalid. Id.
The SBE is required to conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 10 ILCS 5/28-12 to allow the petition proponent, PMI, to present evidence to rebut the SBE’s presumption of invalidity. There is no provision that allows petition signers to present evidence that their signature is valid. The hearing will begin August 5, 2006 in front of a single hearing examiner. The SBE will begin an en banc evidentiary hearing on August 11, 2006, using primarily the report and recommendation of the hearing examiner. Following that hearing, the SBE will issue a final order declaring the validity or invalidity of the petition. But, PMI is unable to present sufficient to rebut the presumption without a favorable ruling on some of the issues raised in this cause. (Exhibit 11.)
ARGUMENT
II. A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD ISSUE IN THIS CAUSE.
Preliminary injunctive relief may be issued when the movant has: 1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits ; 2) no adequate remedy at law or the movants would be irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction; 3) the threatened injury to the movants outweighs that which the injunction would inflict on the defendant; and when 4) granting such an injunction would not “disserve the public interest.” Cox v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir. 1989); O'Connor v. Board of Education, 645 F.2d 578, 580 (7th Cir. 1981); Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984). Reasonable likelihood of success upon the merits directly effects how much weight is given to the balancing of harms, Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Services, 736 F.2d 1153, 1159 (7th Cir. 1984), and requires only that the movant’s “chances are better than negligible…,” Roland Machinery Co., 749 F.2d at 386. (quoting Omega Satellite Products Co, v, City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d. 119, 123 (7th Cir. 1982). “The purpose of [preliminary injunctive relief] is to preserve the object of controversy in its then existing condition, i.e., to preserve the status quo.” EEOC v. Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1259 (7th Cir. 1980). “The decision whether to grant a temporary restraining order lies within the discretion of th[e] Court.” Saukstelis v. Chicago, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15298 (N.D. Ill. 1989). A temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction should be granted in this cause for the reasons set forth below.
A. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS.
a. THE STATE’S REGULATIONS VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
i. The State’s Regulations Violate the Plaintiffs’ Rights to Petition the Government
The initiative petition in Illinois represents the quintessential mechanism to petition the government for redress of grievances. In Illinois, the voters are not initiating law. Instead, they are collectively making their voices known to the state legislature to change Illinois law. This right “comprehends demands [by citizens] for an exercise by the Government of its powers in furtherance of the interest and prosperity of the petitioners, and of their views on politically contentious matters.” Streif v. Bovinette, 88 Ill.App.3d 1079, 1082 (1980) (citation omitted).
The right to petition has been deemed “the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.” B&K Const. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). “The right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First Amendment], and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985). And it even predates the guarantees of freedom of speech, assembly, equal protection and due process since its origin is in the Magna Carta which granted the barons the right to petition the King of England for redress in 1215. A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 263 F.3d 239 (3rd Cir., 2001). Indeed, the right to petition “is implicit in the very idea of government, republican in form.” McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482. (citation omitted). “A citizen’s right to communicate and to address his government in matters which he deems to be important cannot be lightly subjected to restraint.” Streif v. Bovinette, 88 Ill.App.3d 1079, 1083 (1980) (citing cases); Citizens Against Rent Control Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981) (“regulation of First Amendment rights is always subject to exacting judicial review”).
The burdens that the state imposes on the people’s ability to petition the government by advisory petition are severe. See Exhibit 8, Declaration of Plaintiff David E. Smith. This is particularly true for the circulators of the petition.
It should be noted that the very requirement in 10 ILCS 5/28-9 that the petition must contain the signatures of registered voters equaling at least 8% of the votes cast in the last gubernatorial election, is constitutionally suspect, even without the other burdens the Election Code imposes on such petitions. Unlike nominations for candidates for statewide office and for new political parties, the petition proponents in this case did not have a set and unfluctuating number of signatures to obtain. 10 ILCS 5/10-3 and 10 ILCS 5/10-2. Rather, the proponents were required to obtain some 283,000 signatures of registered voters statewide, a number more than eleven times the amount required of those seeking statewide office or a new political party.
The State can provide no justification for this exceedingly high number of required signatures, and particularly not when the other restrictions of Article 28 of the Election Code applying to statewide advisory petitions are factored in. This court has before it competent evidence in the Smith affidavit and otherwise, establishing the grave burdens placed upon the circulators of the subject question. The United States Supreme Court has previously stricken unjustifiably high signature requirements (see Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Worker Party, 440 U.S. 173, 99 S.Ct. 983 (1979)). Here, the signature amount is eleven times that required for other statewide matters, and may increase as population does. Either alone, or in conjunction with the other burdens imposed on the petition circulators and the resulting adverse affect upon voters, this court should strike the statutory scheme.
Additionally, the requirement that all signatures on a petition sheet be limited to one election jurisdiction necessarily limits the size of the audience a petition circulator can reach. It cannot be disputed that the best locations for collecting petition signatures are public events that draw large crowds, such as churches or sporting events. The larger the event, the more likely that there will be attendees from multiple election jurisdictions. Public events with a broad appeal often attract audiences from all over the state. There are 102 counties in Illinois and 9 boards of election commissioners, one of which is a county board of election commissioner; thus, there is a total of 110 different election jurisdictions. Accordingly, for a petition circulator to have the ability to reach any attendee with whom he or she may interact, the circulator would have to carry petition sheets for each election jurisdiction that might be represented at the event. Such an approach is impracticable, for petition circulators must be able to engage potential signers quickly and have the petition ready for signing. See, e.g., Exhibit 8, Declaration of Plaintiff David E. Smith.
The single election jurisdiction limitation also makes it less likely that referendum proponents will garner the number of signatures necessary to place the question on the ballot. By limiting the size of the audience circulators can reach, and by disallowing signatures on a sheet with signatures from another election jurisdiction, 10 ILCS 5/28-9 interferes with the ability to collect the burdensome number of signatures required to place a question of public policy on the ballot. Moreover, Illinois puts a special disability on collecting signatures to petition the government for the redress of grievances that it does not place on other petitions. For example, statewide candidate petitions do not have a State Board conformity examination random sample signature examination requirement. 10ILCS 5/28-10. It is only public questions that have the conformity examination and State Board random sample signature requirement. The state cannot possibly have a valid interest in crippling the people’s right to ask for a change in law, while not placing the same burden on candidates running for public office. “In its journey to ensure the integrity of the electoral process, a state legislature must march across the hallowed ground on which fundamental first amendment rights take root. The terrain must be negotiated with circumspection and care: disparities, in whatever guise, are not casually to be condoned.” Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 43 (1st Cir. 1993). The state simply cannot constitutionally justify putting special disabilities on the people’s right to petition the legislature for the adoption of a constitutional amendment without meeting strict scrutiny. Id.
ii. The State’s Regulations Substantially Burden Plaintiffs’ Core Political Speech
The Supreme Court has h
eld that the activity of obtaining signatures on petitions for a citizen initiative is core political speech. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988). The Court observed that “[t]he circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change.” Id. at 421. The Court held that the fact that the law permitted the proponents to use other methods to obtain signatures did “not take their speech through petition circulators outside the bounds of First Amendment protection” because it “restrict[ed] access to the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political discourse . . . .” Id. at 424. Moreover, “there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First Amendment] was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). Thus, regulations on the speech involved in this case mandates the strictest constitutional scrutiny possible. Indeed, it requires exacting scrutiny “at its zenith.” Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422.
The challenge in Meyer involved a Colorado statute that made it a felony to pay petition circulators. The Court held that the prohibition:
restricts political expression in two ways: First, it limits the number of voices who will convey appellees’ message and the hours they can speak and, therefore, limits the size of the audience they can reach. Second, it makes it less likely that appellees will garner the number of signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion.
Id. at 422-23 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). The state’s interest in protecting the integrity of the initiative process did “not justify the prohibition because the State has failed to demonstrate that it is necessary to burden appellees’ ability to communicate their message in order to meet its concerns.” Id. at 426.
In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999), the Supreme Court reiterated its Meyer holding in overturning additional Colorado initiative regulations. The Court held that petition circulators could not be limited to registered voters for the same reasons that Colorado could not prohibit paying for circulators – the regulation limited communication of the proponents’ message and reduced the chances of qualifying an initiative for the ballot. Id. at 194; see also Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2000) involving an Illinois statewide candidate petition.
As noted above, the separate jurisdiction requirement for signatures puts a heavy burden on PMI’s circulators (Exhibit 8.) Indeed, disallowing signatures on a sheet with signatures from another jurisdiction places an impermissible burden on core political speech. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422-23. In this case, it has interfered with substantially more speech than necessary to accomplish any legitimate state interest. See Krislov, 226 F.3d at 864 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
If the State’s concern is with the administrative convenience of getting petition signatures to the relevant election jurisdiction for a determination of validity, it could accomplish that purpose without impermissibly burdening speech. For example, the State could require that when a petition sheet contains signatures of multiple jurisdictions, initiative proponents must submit a copy of the sheet to each jurisdiction represented. The State could even require that proponents identify which signatures are from that jurisdiction. Such a procedure would place no administrative burden on the State, and would permit petition circulators to make full use of their one-on-one contact opportunities to convey their message to potential signatories without the hindrance of searching for the proper jurisdiction sheet.
iii. The State’s Regulations are an Unconstitutional Content-Based Restriction of Plaintiffs’ Rights to Freedom of Speech.
Illinois has placed content-based restrictions on speech by treating initiative petitions differently than candidate petitions. Content-based restrictions are subject to “the most exacting scrutiny.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); see also Ariz. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a content-based restriction is subject to strict scrutiny). In Turner, the Supreme Court defined content-based restrictions as regulations “that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.” 512 U.S. at 642. If the regulation “cannot be applied without reference to [the] content of the communication,” then the regulation is content based. Bayless, 320 F.3d at 1009.
Illinois imposes a “differential burden” on initiative petitions that it does not impose on petitions for a new statewide political party or statewide candidates for political office, which are not limited to sheets with other signatures from the same jurisdiction. 10 ILCS 5/7-10, 10-2,
10-4. Signatures on petitions relating to public questions for political subdivisions of the state involving more than one election jurisdiction are not limited to sheets with other signatures from the same election jurisdiction. 10 ILCS 5/28-3, 28-5, 28-6, 28-7. What is more, no other petition in the state grants election officials unbridled discretion to determine if a signature “reasonably compares” to the voter’s registration card. 10 ILCS 5/28-11(2). Whether a particular petition must be subject to the burdens of the Illinois regulation cannot be determined “without reference to [the] content of the communication.” If it is a candidate petition, or any other petition, it is not subject to these restrictions. Only if it is a petition for a statewide advisory question or constitutional voter initiated question is the petition subject to these additional restrictions. Thus, initiative petitions are placed at a disadvantage solely because of the content of their speech.
Justice Thomas recognized that a regulation burdening initiative petitions that does not burden candidate petitions is a content-based restriction in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182, 209 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring). In Buckley, a group of Colorado citizens challenged a law that required initiative petition circulators to wear an identification badge, but did not put the same burden on candidate petition circulators. Id. at 209-10. Thomas found that the restriction was a content-based regulation of speech: “[T]he category of burdened speech is defined by its content—Colorado’s badge requirement does not apply to those who circulate candidate petitions, only to those who circulate initiative or referendum proposals.” Id. (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
Similarly, in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992), the Supreme Court held that a Tennessee regulation was a content-based restriction that prohibited the display or distribution of campaign materials and the solicitation of votes within 100 feet of the entrance of a polling place. Id. at 193. The Court held that the regulation was content-based because whether the speaker was prohibited from speaking was based solely on the content of his speech: “Whether individuals may exercise their free speech rights near polling places depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a political campaign . . . the First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to a restriction on a particular viewpoint, but also to a prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.” Id. at 197.
The state simply may not treat advisory petitions differently from other petitions simply because they are advisory petitions. To do so is unambiguously content-based regulation of free speech that must meet strict scrutiny.
iv. The Statutes At Issue Are Overbroad And Plaintiffs May
Assert The Rights Of The Petition Signers.
The 10 ILCS 5/28-10 and 11 requirements for a State Board conformity examination random sampling for signature validity as to whether the signature reasonably compares or whether the signer is registered at the address opposite his signature on the petition are targeted only to voter initiated public questions provided for in 10 ILCS 5/28-10. Such statutes for targeting severely impacts, both facially and as applied, the First and Fourteenth Amendments. While these State investigations fatally impact many of the petition signers, in this instance, they also fatally impact upon the Plaintiff PMI because they are preventing the petition question from appearing upon the ballot. The effect of these State actions is to defeat the petition because PMI cannot obtain sufficient evidence, as required by 10 ILCS 5/28-12 to rebut a presumption of invalidity without this court holding in favor of Plaintiffs’ in at least some of the issues raised here.
A statute is overbroad when “there [is] a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court ….” Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987). Here, the statutes at issue compromise the First Amendment rights, as well as other constitutional rights, of literally thousands of petition signers. And, those petition signers cannot even appear before the SBE on their own behalf, not only because they are not allowed to do so by 10 ILCS 5/28-12. Thus, the constitutional rights of thousands of Illinois citizens are nullified before they are ever able to vindicate their rights in time for their signatures to be counted on the petition. The application of the rule stated to our facts would seem to require a finding by this Court that the statutes are facially and as applied overbroad.
And, with regard to Plaintiffs’ standing to assert the rights of the petition signers, plaintiffs have challenged the State’s regulations facially and as applied as being overbroad. The overbreadth doctrine allows plaintiffs to challenge the State’s regulations on behalf of others not before the Court. Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987). The Supreme Court has noted that to bring a challenge on behalf of a third party, “the crucial issues are whether [the plaintiff] satisfies the requirement of “injury-in-fact” and whether it can be expected satisfactorily to frame the issues in the case.” Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958 (1984). A plaintiff can be expected to satisfactorily frame issues in the case if he or she has a “sufficiently concerted interest in the outcome of the case.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1991). ). Here, Plaintiffs have article three standing in their own right, and certainly have sufficient interest in the outcome of the case, as the petition sponsors, to satisfactorily frame the issues.

Furthermore, plaintiffs also stand in a special relationship with petition signers, and thus can bring claims on their behalf on that basis as well. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (physician and director of Planned parenthood allowed to challenge statute on behalf of patient); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (owners of private school allowed to assert rights of potential pupils and parents); Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the owner of an adult entertainment establishment had overbreadth standing to pursue a First Amendment challenge against provisions of an ordinance that required the employees of such establishments to obtain a license because the licensing scheme-although not directly applicable to the owner-threatened his business's viability). Indeed, most of the petition signers will never know that their signatures have been invalidated because the State gives them no notice or opportunity to be heard. Thus, the Plaintiffs must be allowed to assert those rights for them, lest petition signer’s constitutional rights be irretrievably lost.
v. The State Cannot Meet Strict Scrutiny.
The State cannot possibly show a compelling interest in subjecting citizen initiated advisory opinions for a constitutional amendment to special restrictions that are not applied to other types of petitions. “[A] regulation perfectly reasonable and appropriate in the face of a given problem is highly capricious if that problem does not exist.” Home Box Office, Inc v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1977). It is well-settled that “[m]ere speculation of harm does not constitute a compelling state interest.” Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 543 (1980). The State “must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC., 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227-228 (1984) (“Without a factual underpinning, the State’s asserted interest lacks the weight we have required of interests properly denominated as compelling”).
If anything, the state would have more of an interest in ensuring the validity of candidate petitions or political party petitions, since their ultimate success or failure at the ballot box will have a direct impact on the government. An advisory opinion is only effective if the Legislature adopts it. At the very least, the state would have the same interest in ensuring the validity of candidate and political party petitions, or petitions relating to public questions for political subdivisions of the state involving more than one election jurisdiction, as it does to advisory petitions for a constitutional amendment.
Moreover, there is not even a rational basis, much less a compelling interest for the state’s special regulations on advisory petitions for a constitutional amendment. For example, the requirement that each election official determine if the signature of the petition signer “reasonably compares” with his or her registration card flies in the face of the customary presumption of validity for signatures. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank v. Bernius, 127 Ill. App. 3d 193, 198-99 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing that under the Uniform Commercial Code, signatures are presumed to be valid); see also Comment to 810 ILCS 5/3-308 (“The Presumption [that signatures are valid] rests upon the fact that in ordinary experience forged or unauthorized signatures are very uncommon”). Instead giving this same presumption of validity to petition signers for a constitutional advisory question, the State subjects them to arbitrary and standardless scrutiny. The State simply does not have a compelling interest in applying these special restrictions to an advisory question, especially when it does not place them on all but any other petition in Illinois except statewide constitutional voter initiated petition described in 10 ILCS 5/28-9..
b. THE STATE’S REGULATIONS VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS’ EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
i. The Regulations Must Survive Strict Scrutiny Because They Infringe Upon a Fundamental Right.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the States to treat all similarly-situated persons equally. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). As noted above, petitions signers for petitions for an advisory opinion are treated differently that petition signers for all but one statewide constitutional initiative, than for any other petition in Illinois. Not only is this disparate treatment a violation of Free Speech, it is also a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 (1972), the Supreme Court held that content-based restrictions violate Fourteenth Amendment equal protection because they treat different forms of speech differently. See also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 n.3 (1992) (“Content-based restrictions also have been held to raise Fourteenth Amendment equal protection concerns because, in the course of regulating speech, such restrictions differentiate between types of speech”). Moreover, because the differential treatment affects fundamental rights like free speech, the right to vote, and the right to petition the government, they are subject to strict scrutiny. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
ii. The Regulations Violate Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights Because They Lack Objective Standards.
The statute at issue in this case (10 ILCS 5/28-11) grants the government unbridled discretion in determining whether a signature is valid. The law requires each election official to “[d]etermine if the signature of the person who signed the petition reasonably compares with the signature shown on that person’s registration record card.” 10 ILCS 5/28-11(2) (emphasis added). Each election official, in his or her sole discretion, must determine if signatures of petition signers are valid by comparing them to the signer’s registration record card. 10 ILCS 5/29-11(2). The only “standard” is that the signature should “reasonably compare” to the registration record card. Id. This leaves each election official in the state to subjectively determine how a signature “reasonably compares” to the registration record card. See Exhibit 6 which provides selected examples of invalid signatures found valid in Chicago as well as the standards which an expert handwriting examiner would follow. While Plaintiffs do not argue only should expert handwriting examiners, Plaintiffs do argue that a specific signature comparison standard be set and that training be required of the election authority employees doing the comparisons.
The Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000), found that standardless manual recount procedures in the presidential election violated equal protection because each county decided what constituted a valid vote. “The problem inheres in the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application.” Id. at 106; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972) (vague laws give decision makers unbridled discretion). So too “has the lack of standards in our case adversely impacted our Plaintiffs.
As Plaintiffs have shown by expert evidence, there are multiple reasons why a signature on the registration record card may differ from the petition signature. (Exhibit 6.) Signatures on registration record cards reflect the signer’s signature at the time of registration, even though the initiative petition may be signed years later. As Plaintiffs’ expert testified, the passage of time changes a person’s signature, whether it is from ill health or simply advanced age. The conditions under which a voter signs an initiative petition may differ substantially from when he or she signed the voter registration card. Moreover, petitions are often signed while standing and holding a clipboard or signed in a hurry as in cold weather with gloves on. It is not surprising that a signature made under such conditions will differ substantially from one signed while sitting at a table or desk, as is usually the case with voter registration cards. These factors can change a signature so that it may not “reasonably compare” with the original, as well as other factors described in Exhibit 6.
Even though the standards vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and there are several reasons that a signature on a petition will often differ from a voter registration card, there is no way for an individual petition signer to rehabilitate his or her signature by introducing extrinsic evidence. There is absolutely no safeguard in the Board’s procedures to prevent nullification of a petition signer’s signature in the sole discretion of individual election officials. A voter’s signature can be disqualified solely based on the subjective opinion that the signature does not “reasonably compare” to the voter registration card. His determination is final subject only to the ability in terms of money and manpower of the petition proponent to gather the evidence to overcome this “finality.”. Equal Protection requires that the petition signer’s voice will not be nullified by such a standardless system.
c. 10 ILCS 5/28-9 VIOLATES PLAINTIFFS’ DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
It is well established that the government may not deprive one of “life, liberty or property” without due process of law. See U.S. Constitution, Amendment Fourteen ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The concept of due process does not necessarily prohibit the state from depriving an individual of one of these rights but requires the government to implement procedures to protect the public from erroneous and/or arbitrary deprivations. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (“Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property”); see also id., at 266. (noting “the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed,” and emphasizing that “the right to procedural due process is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant's substantive assertions”).
While the right to due process may be “absolute,” it is also “flexible and calls for such procedural safeguards as the situation demands.” Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997)(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). Given this flexibility, the Supreme Court has established an analytical framework in order to examine this issue. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the Supreme Court reaffirmed Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) stating:
Mathews dictates that the process due in any given instance is determined by weighing “ the private interest that will be affected by the official action” against the Government's asserted interest, “including the function involved” and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater process. 424 U.S., at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. The Mathews calculus then contemplates a judicious balancing of these concerns, through an analysis of “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” of the private interest if the process were reduced and the “ probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards.”
The Northern District of Illinois consolidated the above considerations by balancing the following three factors: 1. the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 2. the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and 3. the Government’s interest. See Zessar v. Helander, 2006 WL 642464 (N.D. Ill 2006). When the issues presented in this case are viewed through the template set out above, it is clear that 10 ILCS 5/28-9 violates the Plaintiffs’ due process rights. Moreover, as noted above, 10 ILCS 5/28-12 prevents a petition signer whose signature has been held invalid from undertaking his or her own defense. Since 10 ILCS 5/28-12 only allows the petition proponent, PMI, to defend, the injured signer is further vexed with respect to due process. Such petition signers should not be made subject to the vagaries of a non-profit organization’s ability to raise money and to recruit the volunteers it takes with regard to the PMI petition signer signature rehabilitation efforts. Furthermore, such work must be done on-site at the office of the election jurisdictions in order to obtain the signature on file of the registered voters as well as to cause a search for a missing voter registration card. And, such work may only be done during the business hours of the jurisdiction’s office - - a further impediment to recruiting volunteers, especially those who must work for a living. See petition signer Exhibits 7, 9 and 10 wherein the signers would like to undertake their own defense.
i. Plaintiffs’ Fundamental Liberty Interests Require Substantial Due Process Protection.
Fundamental liberty interests or entitlements upon which the very well-being of an individual is dependent, like the right to vote, warrant a strict adherence to due process procedures. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). “Because voting is a fundamental right, the right to vote is a ‘liberty’ interest that may not be confiscated without due process.” Raetzel v. Parks\Bellemont Absentee Election Bd., 762 F.Supp. 1354, 1354 (D. Ariz. 1990).
For constitutional purposes, signatures such as those used for petitions have been treated the same as actual votes. Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2003). Signatures, like votes, are “an expression of a registered voter’s will.” Id. While a petition does not involve a traditional choice between candidates, it does implicate a decision between alternative choices. Padilla v. Lever, 429 F.3d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 2005). As discussed at length herein, the statutes cited also violates Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to free speech. Consequently, the government must establish adequate procedural safeguards to insure against erroneous and/or arbitrary exclusions of valid signatures. Fundamental concepts of due process mandate that once a signature is deemed to be invalid, the affected person should be notified and afforded an opportunity to be heard on the matter. Moreover, decision making officials should have objective guidelines by which to review applicable signatures. Finally, petition signers should be allowed to undertake their own defense.
ii. The Statutes Failure to Provide Plaintiffs’ Timely Notice and a Right to be Heard Will Lead to Erroneous and/or Arbitrary Exclusions.
Notice and an opportunity to heard are elementary mechanisms designed to address government abuse and to reverse erroneous and/or arbitrary government action. In this case, the state has unilaterally rejected Plaintiffs’ signatures without providing notice to those signatories or an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, many signatures are specifically shown to have been erroneously held invalid. Marsh Exhibit 6 provides examples of such holdings from a sampling of selected signatures. Exhibits 7, 9 and 10 contain declarations by petition signer plaintiffs that no notice to defend was given and that they desire the right to undertake their own defense. “For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.” Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972); Raetzel v. Parks\Bellemont Absentee Election Bd., 762 F.Supp. 1354, 1358 (D. Ariz. 1990) (“The right to notice and the opportunity to be heard ‘must be granted at a meaningful time.”) (quoting Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81).
The fundamental nature of the rights at issue in this case requires that affected signers of the petition receive notice and opportunity to defend before the petition is finalized and the signatures made official. Any vindication after this point would fail to properly redress those affected. Indeed, the signatory’s right will have been “irremediably denied.” Zessar v. Helander, 2006 WL 642646 (N.D. Ill. 2006). The petition process requires, at least, that every eligible person have notice when their signatures have been invalidated so that they have an opportunity to redress their injury while their vote still means something.
In Zessar v. Helander, this Court determined that it was a violation of due process to reject an absentee voter ballot without giving the voter an opportunity to be heard before the election results were final. In Zessar, an absentee voter’s ballot was rejected because the election board determined that the signature on the absentee ballot did not match the voter’s signature on his voter registration card. Id. at *1. Although that determination was in error, the voter was not notified that his ballot had been rejected until after the election. Id. This Court held that the state was required to give “notice and a hearing, before rejecting an absentee ballot.” Id. at *5.
In that case the court pointed out that one possible way to remedy the defect could consist of a mailing within days of the rejected ballot wherein the voter would be invited to send back an affidavit correcting any deficiencies presented in the initial ballot. Similarly, the officials in this case could simply mail a document to the individuals whose signatures are questioned and give that person the opportunity to submit some form of documentation verifying the individual’s identity.
An Arizona federal district court came to the same conclusion when it was confronted with a similar question. In Raetzel v. Parks/Bellemont Absentee Election Board, 762 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1990), the court found that the state violated a voter’s right to due process because it failed to give a disqualified absentee voter notice and an opportunity to be heard before the election was final. Similar to this case, the state gave notice to a third party, but not the actual voter. Id. at 1357. The court held that because “notice [was] derivative through the political party… [u]nder the present statutory scheme, a voter whose vote is [ ] challenged and disqualified will remain unaware of the disqualification.” Id. The court noted “[t]he disqualified voter may never ascertain the justification for the rejection of their vote in order to cure the defect for future eligibility.” Raetzel, 762 F.Supp. at 1358. Thus, the court found that failure to notify the actual individual violated due process. Id. The procedures at issue in this case suffer the same defects. Like the absentee ballot procedure in Zessar and Raetzel, 10 ILCS 5\28-12 fails to provide the minimum due process required to protect the Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights.
iii. The Statutes Failure to Include Objective Standards to Guide the Deciding Officials in Examining Plaintiffs’ Signatures lead to Erroneous and/or Arbitrary Exclusions.
Clear and objective standards are also inherent in our concept of due process. In this case, 10 ILCS 5\28-12 vests unbridled discretion in government officials when deciding whether a signature on a petition “reasonably compares” to the signature on a voter registration card. The lack of objective standards leaves each individual decision maker to his or her subjective will as it relates to signature recognition. Moreover, there is no requirement that these individuals have any training or expertise in handwriting analysis which might qualify them to make these important decisions.
Procedural safeguards are the foundation of due process. The lack of adequate procedures creates an impermissible risk that government officials will interfere with a fundamental liberty interest either inadvertently or intentionally. There is a long line of cases which clearly illustrate the dangers associated with unbridled government discretion. Most of these cases arise in the free speech context when the exercise of that speech requires prior government approval. In Southeastern Promotions, LTD v. Conrad 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) the Supreme Court stated:
The settled rule is that a system of prior restraint avoids constitutional infirmity
only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.’ Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58, 85 S.Ct. 734, 739, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). See United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1403, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419-421, 91 S.Ct. 423, 429, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139, 141-142, 88 S.Ct. 754, 756, 19 L.Ed.2d 966 (1968). See also Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 489-490, 93 S.Ct. 2789, 2793, 37 L.Ed.2d 745 (1973); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S., at 70-71, 83 S.Ct. at 639; Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 77 S.Ct. 1325, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469 (1957).
In the same manner, officials in this case have interfered with the Plaintiffs’ rights to petition the government through this referendum process. As noted above, the Supreme Court has recognized the petition process as core political speech deserving of the utmost protection. See infra, Section IAii. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (1999); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988).
The lack of specific standards in this context makes erroneous and arbitrary signature
exclusions inevitable. Therefore, the “risk of erroneous deprivation[s] of fundamental rights far outweighs the states interest in preserving its current ad hoc method of particular signatures. iv. Only a minimal burden would be placed on the state if the
current procedure is changed to provide constitutionally mandated due process to the Plaintiffs.
Providing notice and an opportunity to correct the erroneous invalidation of signatures would not place a heavy burden upon the State. On the contrary, a simple verification card or a notice of signature invalidation could be sent to the affected party’s address stating the reason for the invalidation. The affected parties could provide exemplars of their signatures on a form provided. These person’s would then have their notice and opportunity to defend. The same would be done for a voter found to be not registered at the address opposite his name, to the address indicated on the petition sheet. The number of people to whom this “paper hearing” would apply would be minimal compared to the entire petition and their addresses in that only those signatures invalidated in the sample and whose signatures were erroneously removed, might possibly seek to correct the error; estimated to be about 20% of 9,923 invalidated sample signatures or 1,985 signatures would need to be contacted (in the instant case) (Exhibit 12).
The State could simply place notice in pre-determined newspapers listing those signatures which had been invalidated and allowing them opportunity to provide information on a form contained in the notice which would correct any error. Again, the number of people to which these methods would apply is a relatively small in the instant case because only those in the sample would be affected.
While the state’s burden would be light, the benefit upon the petition process would be substantial. By correcting the invalidation percentage - which is based upon the sample - thousands of signatures which would have been invalidated would be allowed. The State has an interest in promoting the most accurate and fair petition as possible. Therefore, changing the current procedures would place only a minimal burden on the State while providing the Plaintiffs the due process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The State could also implement objective standards to guide officials in regard to signature verification. Rather than using the vague standard that signatures must be “reasonably comparable” to those on the voter registration cards, the statute could articulate specific criterion which experts use to compare handwriting. Moreover, since one’s signature is presumed to be valid, deciding officials should carry the burden of indicating in writing the objective basis for the exclusion. This would reduce the number of signatures which would be erroneously or arbitrarily excluded. Furthermore, the State could also provide record search standards to guide the election authorities, such as requiring a cross search also of the hard copy of the signer’s voter registration card. This would also reduce the number excluded.
B. THE PLAINTIFFS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM IF AN INJUNCTION IS NOT GRANTED.
Irreparable harm is that which “cannot be prevented or fully rectified by the final judgment after trial….” Roland Machinery Co. 749 F.2d at 386. If this Court does not issue a temporary restraining order staying the August 5, 2006 evidentiary hearing before the Hearing Examiner, Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights will be forever lost if PMI cannot find sufficient competent evidence to overcome the presumption of invalidity and, as of this writing, it appears PMI cannot do it due to lack of wherewithal and manpower, despite its best efforts. "The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 2006 WL 1881131 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms is presumed to constitute an irreparable injury”). Once signatures are nullified by the Board at the August 11, 2006 hearing and the Board’s decision in finalized, those signatures cannot be rehabilitated. Thus, it is necessary to preserve the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights that this Court issue a preliminary injunction.
C. THE PUBLIC INTEREST WILL NOT BE DISSERVED NOR WILL THE DEFENDANTS BE HARMED BY THE ISSUANCE OF THE TRO.
The public will benefit from a TRO and preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiffs. “[I]njunctions protecting First Amendment freedoms are always in the public interest.” Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 2006 WL 1881131 (7th Cir. 2006). Protecting the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights will assure that the Plaintiffs’ do not lose their right to due process by having their signatures nullified without notice and opportunity to be heard, or their right to equal protection by having their signatures nullified by standardless procedures. This benefit will inure to all voters in the state, ensuring that their signatures in this election and future elections cannot be expunged by unconstitutional state regulations. Moreover, a delay in the finalization of the evidentiary hearing will not harm the plaintiffs, so long as the merits are resolved in time for the printing of ballots. Defendants will not deny the ballots need to be printed about 40 days before the November 2 general election, at least in the jurisdictions of the Cook County clerk and the Chicago election commission; or, before at least 35 days before the election due to a federal absentee ballot availability rule. Thus, the public interest will be served by the issuance of the TRO. And as noted above at Section 5.c.iv., an injunction will not harm the Defendants.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons given, these Plaintiffs pray their motions for a Temporary Restraining Order and then, for a Preliminary Injunction be granted.
DATE: July 28, 2006

Respectfully submitted,


____________________________________
One of Plaintiffs’ attorneys


























Michael E. Lavelle, #1590723
Kevin E. Bry, #6200436
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Lavelle & Motta, Ltd.
218 N. Jefferson St., Suite 102
Chicago, IL 60661
312-559-0600
Facsimile: 312-559-1335

  

What's with the two-headed chicken The picture was originally picked just to have SOMETHING to stick up there in the corner. It's growing on me however. Here's the story behind it.

That is me in a two-headed chicken suit, in the pressroom at our State Capitol building in Springfield, Illinois, during a press conference. This picture ran in the Chicago Tribune. I have to say it was an awesome feeling walking through our state capitol in a two-headed chicken suit. I can probably say I am the only person on this earth that has done that. So it's a good story for someone else's grandchildren. The guy on the left was our candidate for Governor in 2002, Cal Skinner. Cal was a Republican state representative for 16 years in Springfield and was a county treasurer before that. Cal was also not invited or allowed to participate in any of the candidate debates during the campaign for Governor. This despite Cal having more experience working for our state government than both the other candidates COMBINED.

The idea behind the chicken was Cal's. The debate sponsors had announced the debates, and the Illinois media reported the debates, but didn't mention that Cal had not been invited in any of their articles. So Cal thought up this gimmick, good or bad, to try to get the media to at least notice that there was another candidate running for Governor that would not be in the debates. That worked to a certain degree, and a few in media finally gave us some mentions. The reporters that had seen Cal in action on the assembly floor knew Cal would have been a very formidable debate opponent for the candidates, and we knew he would have mopped the floor with their double speak and avoidance of answering the questions and non-committal stances on the issues. A few reporters knew that too, and reported as such.

The name of the chicken was JimRod, from the two first names of the old party candidates, Jim Ryan and Rod Blagojevich. Both Jim and Rod were Golden Gloves boxers in their youth and both of them used that in their campaigns. So why not call them chickens for refusing to get into the debate ring with a measly Libertarian?

Rod Blagojevich turned out to be the bigger chicken. One of the debates was scheduled for our old capitol building. There are three entrances to this building. One on each side, and one from underground. Our supporters were the first ones there, and we stood outside with picket signs proclaiming the debates a sham without our candidate in them, and we had JimRod there. Jim Ryan's supporters came next, and they occupied the opposite side of the building's entrance. Then Rod's people came, and they could either stand with Ryan's supporters, or stand on our side, so they picked our side.

Jim Ryan showed up, and like a boxing match, walked through his supporters shaking hands and getting pats on the back. Rod Blagojevich showed up and sat in his minivan. The Blagojevich supporters were buzzing on when he was going to walk into the building. About ten minutes went past and they were still waiting for Blagojevich to come out of his minivan and walk through his crowd of supporters into the old capitol. The problem was, those "dangerous" Libertarians were also on that side of the building. Finally, a Blagojevich organizer came over and grabbed about half of his mob.

Blagojevich was going to enter the old state capitol from underground instead of walking in like a man, and wanted his supporters to form a shield for him to get out of his van and take the stairs underground so that he couldn't possibly have a picture of him taken with the two-headed chicken in the frame. Rod Blagojevich was chicken of JimRod the two-headed chicken and the Libertarians and went to amazing lengths to avoid us. Rod Blagojevich proved to be a sissy boy that night, and hasn't done much since to dispel that label.

The two-headed chicken has stuck with me now. It's become a symbol for all the Republicans and Democrats that go to Cuba-like extremes to avoid any real opposition to them. It's a symbol that the Republicans and Democrats DO NOT BELIEVE IN DEMOCRACY. That they refuse to even acknowledge the issue of free and equal elections. That they refuse to look in the mirror to see their hypocrisy and their antidemocratic rules that oppresses opposition. That they are afraid to engage in any REAL debate on REAL issues and REAL policies. That they have NO principles and NO integrity and NO belief in the liberties our American revolutionaries fought and died for. Republicans and Democrats are chickens, plain and simple. Two heads on one giant body only looking out for themselves. Sure they bicker once and a while as you might expect when there are two small brains trying to control one body, but more times that not, they are doing all they can to protect the power they enjoy.

It doesn't matter if you think or they think Libertarians are right or wrong. What matters is that our voters have the opportunity to decide for themselves WITHOUT the two-headed chicken deciding for them. What matters is that our elections in America are not controlled by those in power just like they are in China, Cuba, Syria, Iran, and all the other oppressive countries. The two-headed chicken is the perfect symbol for the Republicans and Democrats with their lack of integrity and their tyrannical quest for power. There is no other explanation for the Republicans and Democrats excluding opposition from debates, writing election laws that massively discriminate again opposition, or illegally using state employees for their own campaigns than they are power hungry and CHICKEN of any opposing views. Forget the elephants and donkeys. Republicans and Democrats are nothing but CHICKENS.

Radio Ad – Chickenman 1

JimRod: Brauch, bro-brok.

Announcer 1: It’s Chickenman. It’s Chickman.

Announcer 2 No, it’s not. It’s JimRod, the two-headed chicken who running for Governor. Let’s listen in.

Jim: Not Skinner Not Skinner.

Rod: Won’t debate. Won’t debate Skinner.

Announcer 1: What are they talking about?

Announcer 2: Sounds as if JimRod doesn’t want to debate Cal Skinner, the Libertarian Party candidate for Governor. I wonder why.

Announcer 1: I don’t know. Maybe JimRod is afraid Skinner will bring up some new ideas.

Announcer 2: Well, new ideas are something JimRod certainly doesn’t have, but nobody’s voting for Skinner.

Announcer 1: That’s not what the polls say.

Announcer 2: Why won’t the Rockford paper and TV station let Cal Skinner debate.

Announcer 1: I guess they’re all afraid of new ideas.

Announcer 3: Vote Libertarian for a change.
Vote Cal Skinner for a REAL CHANGE.

Skinner: Paid for by Skinner4Governor.org,
Reece Reed, Treasurer

Announcer 3: Stay turned to this station when JimRod, the two-headed chicken running for governor says, “The sky is falling. The sky is falling.”

Below is a copy of the lawsuit brought by Jersey County taxpayer advocate Jeff Ferguson. Sorry that some of the spacing is off and bold face did not come through the copying here.


IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
JERSEY COUNTY, ILLINOIS


Jeffrey D. Ferguson, Ron Floyd, Woody Goforth, )
Harold Kallal, Gary Krueger, Robert Ruland, )
Leland Snyders and Marilyn J. Woolsey, )
individually and as taxpayers of Jersey and )
Greene Counties, State of Illinois ) Cause No.
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
Linda J. Crotchett and Deborah Banghart, in their )
official capacity as the duly elected and acting )
County Clerks of Jersey and Greene Counties, )
State of Illinois, and the Community Unit School )
District #100, a School District in Jersey and )
Greene Counties, State of Illinois, )
)
Defendants. )


COMPLAINT FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs, Jeffrey D. Ferguson, Ron Floyd, Woody Goforth, Harold Kallal, Gary Krueger, Robert Ruland, Leland Snyders and Marilyn J. Woolsey, individually and as taxpayers of Jersey County, Illinois, Plaintiffs herein, by and through their attorneys, for their Complaint for Permanent Injunction, complain of Linda J. Crotchett and Deborah Banghart, in their official capacity as the duly elected and acting County Clerks of Jersey and Greene Counties, and the Community Unit School District #100, Defendants herein, and state that:

1. Plaintiff, Jeffrey D. Ferguson is a citizen of the State of Illinois and a resident
of Jersey County, residing at 15809 Bunse Way, Jerseyville, Illinois 62052 and a taxpayer in

Page 1 of 1
the Community Unit School District #100. Plaintiff Ferguson did not vote on the referendum referred to herein.
2. Plaintiff, Ron Floyd is a citizen of the State of Illinois and a resident of Jersey County, residing at 26431 Main Street, Dow, Illinois 62022 and a taxpayer in the Community Unit School District #100. Plaintiff Floyd voted against the referendum referred to herein.
3. Plaintiff, Woody Goforth is a citizen of the State of Illinois and a resident
of Jersey County, residing at 24554 Witt Mill Road, Jerseyville, Illinois 62052 and a taxpayer in the Community Unit School District #100. Plaintiff Goforth voted against the referendum referred to herein.
4. Plaintiff, Harold Kallal is a citizen of the State of Illinois and a resident of Jersey County, residing at 810 N. State Street, Jerseyville, Illinois 62052 and a taxpayer in the Community Unit School District #100. Plaintiff Kallal voted against the referendum referred to herein.
5. Plaintiff, Gary Krueger is a citizen of the State of Illinois and a resident of Jersey County, residing at 26571 McClusky Road, Dow, Illinois 62022 and a taxpayer in the Community Unit School District #100. Plaintiff Krueger voted against the referendum referred to herein.
6. Plaintiff, Robert Ruland is a citizen of the State of Illinois and a resident
of Jersey County, residing at 718 Cross Avenue, Jerseyville, Illinois 62052 and a taxpayer in the Community Unit School District #100. Plaintiff Ruland voted against the referendum referred
to herein.
7. Plaintiff, Leland Snyders is a citizen of the State of Illinois and a resident of Jersey County, residing at 717 Cross Avenue, Jerseyville, Illinois 62052 and a taxpayer in the Community Unit School District #100. Plaintiff Snyders voted against the referendum referred to herein.
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8. Plaintiff, Marilyn J. Woolsey, is a citizen of the State of Illinois and a resident of
Greene County, residing at R.R. 1 Box 137, Kane, Illinois 62054 and a taxpayer in the Community Unit School District #100. Plaintiff Woolsey voted against the referendum referred to herein.
9. Defendants Linda J. Crotchett and Deborah Banghart are the duly elected and acting County Clerks of Jersey and Greene Counties, Illinois and are named herein in their official capacities only in that they are responsible for extending school tax levies in these counties.
10. At all times relevant herein, and, presently, Defendant Community Unit School
District #100, hereafter sometimes “the school district”, has been a school district organized and existing under the laws of the State of Illinois, with its district boundaries located in Jersey County, Illinois and Greene County, Illinois.
11. On April 13, 1999, the school district submitted the following proposition to the voters of the Community Unit School District 100, in Jersey and Greene Counties, pursuant to the provisions of 105 ILCS 5/10-22.36:
COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT #100
PROPOSITION TO ISSUE $21,000,000
SCHOOL BUILDING BONDS

SHALL THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER 100, JERSEY AND GREENE COUNTIES, ILLINOIS, PURCHASE A SITE FOR AND BUILD AND EQUIP A NEW HIGH SCHOOL; AND ISSUE FOR BONDS FOR SAID SCHOOL DISTRICT IN THE AMOUNT OF $21,000,000 FOR SAID PURPOSE?

12. The purpose of the issuance of the school bonds as stated in the proposition was to
secure funds needed to purchase a site to build a new high school. A copy of the proposition is

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attached hereto, by reference made a part hereof and marked as “Exhibit 1”.
13. At the time the proposition was submitted to the voters, on April 13, 1999, the school district had applied for additional funds needed to build a new high school from the Illinois Capital Development Board. (ICDB)
14. The estimated cost of the new site and the new high school was approximately $29 million. (i.e. $21 million from the bond issue and approximately $8 million from grants from the ICDB)
15. In Jersey County, the proposition received 1402 “yes” votes (29%) and 3414 “no” votes (71%) while in Greene County the proposition received 426 “yes” votes (36.4%) and 743 “no” votes (63.5%).
16. Each of the named plaintiffs, except Ferguson who was not a resident at the time,
cast “no” votes on this proposition.
17. Calvin E. Morris, of AAIC, Inc. was employed by the school district and
produced plans for the proposed new high school.
18. Despite the defeat of the proposition, the school district sought to raise the funds
needed for a new high school and elementary school from a different source.
19. The new source of funds would be through the issuance of fire prevention and safety
fund bonds pursuant to the provisions of 105 ILCS 5/17-2.11.
20. The issuance of fire prevention and safety fund bonds pursuant to the provisions of 105 ILCS 5/17-2.11 does not require voter approval.

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21. 105 ILCS 5/17-2.11 requires, in part, as follows:
… a school district may replace a school building or build additions
to replace portions of a building when it is determined that the
effectuation of the recommendations for the existing building will cost
more than the replacement costs. Such determination shall be based on a comparison of estimated costs made by an architect or engineer licensed in the State of Illinois. The new building or addition shall be equivalent in area (square feet) and comparable in purpose and grades served and may be on the same site or another site.
(Emphasis ours.)

22. 105 ILCS 5/17-2.11 further provides, in part, as follows:
… such district may, by proper resolution, levy a tax for the
purpose of making such alteration or reconstruction…
If the proceeds from the tax levy authorized by this Section are
insufficient to complete the work approved under this Section,
the school board is authorized to sell bonds without referendum
under the provisions of this Section in an amount that, when
added to the proceeds of the tax levy authorized by this Section,
will allow completion of the approved work. (Emphasis ours.)
23. At the school district’s request, Calvin E. Morris, of AAIC, Inc., on or about October 2, 2000, surveyed the school district’s existing high school.
24. Calvin E. Morris’s survey identified health and safety improvements necessary to bring the school district’s schools into full compliance under 23 ILADM 175, 180 and 185.
25. The total estimated cost by Calvin E. Morris to remedy all code violations and/or necessary correction of health and safety issues for the Jersey Community high school was $742,590.42.
26. Repair estimates from the Health and Life Safety Survey Report for Jersey
Community High School and Grafton Elementary School, hereafter sometimes, the “survey”, are attached hereto, by reference made a part hereof and marked as “Exhibit 2”.
Page 5 of 1
27. Thereafter, a revised survey for the high school, in the amount of $580,514.60 and an Application For Approval were forwarded by the school district for approval to the Regional Office of Education, Regional Superintendent.
28. A copy of the Application For Approval of Ten Year Safety Survey Report (Form ISBE 35-86) is attached hereto, by reference made a part hereof and marked “Exhibit 3”.
29. The Regional Superintendent, on or about December 1, 2000, approved a revised survey in the amount of $531,167 for the high school.
30. The Regional Superintendent also approved a survey in the amount of $204,303 for the Grafton Elementary School which reduced the original estimate to repair or improve the grade school which was estimated to cost $476,082.75.
31. The Certification of Need for Fire Prevention and Safety Funds was signed by the president and secretary of the school district’s board of education.
32. Copies of the Certificates of Need for Fire Prevention and Safety Funds signed by the president and secretary of the school district’s board of education, dated on or about December 7, 2000, and submitted to the State Board of Education are attached hereto, by reference made a part hereof, and marked as “Exhibit 4 and 5”.
33. Copies of the State Superintendent’s Certificate of Approval for Expenditure of
Fire Prevention and Safety Funds, dated May 10, 2001, for Jersey Community High School and Grafton Elementary School are attached hereto, by reference made part hereof, and marked as “Exhibits 6 and 7”.
34. After submission and approval of the revised surveys by the Illinois State Board
of Education on May 10, 2001, the then school district Superintendent discharged AAIC, Inc. and cancelled the approved surveys but left the school district’s applications for state funds pending.
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35. At the school district’s request, David D. Pool of DAI, Inc. then surveyed the high school and the Grafton Elementary School on or about November 13, 2001 and December 6, 2001, respectively.
36. David D. Pool’s surveys also determined that there were several improvements needed for the high school and the Grafton Elementary School for compliance with the Health/Life Safety Code for Public Schools.
37. The total estimated cost by David D. Pool on November 13, 2001 to remedy and to implement improvements for the high school were $12,657,158, $13,872,519 and $13,988,124 and for the Grafton Grade School on December 6, 2001 in the amounts of $2,926,216, 3,417,396 and $3,445,872.
38. Copies of these surveys are attached hereto, by reference made a part hereof and marked as “Exhibits 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13”.
39. The surveys were then forwarded by the school district to the Regional Office of the Illinois State Board of Education along with Certificates of Need for Fire Prevention and Safety Funds in the amount of $13,988,124 for the high school and $3,445,872 for the grade school.
40. The Certificates of Need for Fire Prevention and Safety Funds were signed by the president and secretary of the school district’s board of education.
41. Copies of the Certificates of Need for Fire Prevention and Safety Funds signed by the president and secretary of the school district’s board of education and submitted to the Regional Office of Education and then to State Board of Education are attached hereto, by reference made a part hereof and marked as “Exhibit 14 and 15”.
42. On November 27, 2002, Larry Pfeiffer, the Regional Superintendent of Schools for
the school district, issued an order to make repairs or alterations as necessary to effect full
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compliance with the applicable provisions of the Health/Life Safety Code for Public Schools, or complete the work itemized in the surveys but did not issue certificates of condemnation for the high school or grade school.
43. A copy of the Order to Effect Compliance with the Health/Life Safety Code for Public Schools signed by Larry Pfeiffer is attached hereto, by reference made a part hereof and marked as “Exhibit 16”.
44. On February 11, 2003, the Illinois State Board of Education approved the defendant district’s expenditure of $11, 354,034 in fire prevention and safety funds for the high school and $2,796,984 for the grade school.
45. Copies of the Certificates of Approval for the Expenditure of Fire Prevention and Safety Funds, dated February 11, 2003, and issued by the Illinois State Board of Education are attached hereto, by reference made a part hereof and marked as “Exhibits 17 and 18”.
46. Copies of the replacement cost estimates for Jersey High School ($12,684,893)
and Grafton Elementary School ($3,071,609) dated May 13, 2002 are attached hereto by reference made a part hereof and marked “Exhibits 19 and 20”.
47. Despite the failure to obtain condemnation orders, the school district’s board of education, on or about April 17, 2002, adopted a resolution to issue fire prevention and safety fund bonds in the amount of $14,151,018 to secure funding necessary to build a new high school and elementary school with anticipated funds from the Illinois Capital Development Board for these new schools in the amount of $20,528,288.
48. The Illinois Capital Development Board, in September, 2003, confirmed that the
school district would receive the additional funds when the next round of funds were released.
Page 8 of 1
49. Thereafter, following a public hearing, the school district’s board of education voted 6-1 to issue the fire prevention and safety fund bonds to defray the school district’s share of the cost of a new high school and elementary school.
50. The bond sales took place as follows: $10,998,429.80 on or about March 1, 2003 and $3,721,570.65 on or about September 14, 2004.
51. Copies of the cover pages for the bond prospectuses are attached and incorporated herein by reference as “Exhibits 21 and 22”.
52. In order to pay for the bonds, the County Clerks of Jersey and Greene Counties,
unless enjoined, intend to continue to levy property taxes to pay for the interest and principal of the bonds and to extend tax levies and taxes, annually, until the bonds are paid.
53. Pursuant to 105 ILCS 5/17-2.11, a school board has power to levy a tax or to borrow money and issue bonds for fire prevention, safety, energy conservation, disabled accessibility, school security and specified repair purposes, but, in order to issue bonds for the construction of a new school, a district must first be required to reconstruct a school building by an agency having authority to enforce the school building code.
54. Under the provisions of the Illinois School Code, school districts such as the
Community Unit School District #100 are authorized to borrow money and to issue general obligation bonds after a referendum. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122 § 20-2 (1977)
55. As alleged herein, the voters of Jersey and Greene Counties overwhelmingly
rejected the proposition to issue bonds to construct a new high school.
56. Ignoring the will of the voters and taxpayers, the school district issued fire
prevention and safety bonds, commonly referred to as life safety bonds, which are normally used
Page 9 of 1

to finance repairs and alterations to school buildings necessary to meet fire prevention and safety standards. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 17-2.11a (1977).
57. Before enacting a life safety resolution, a school district board must have received a survey by a licensed architect or engineer, indicating the school facilities need of repairs or alterations to meet fire prevention and safety standards.
58. Repairs may be commenced only after an agency having authority to enforce laws or regulations on fire and safety issues an order requiring a school district to alter or to reconstruct any building or equipment to conform with the fire and safety regulations.
59. The regional superintendent of schools and the state board of education must
approve the estimates of repair costs for life safety work and then, only after appropriate resolutions of the school board, may the county clerk of the county or counties in which the school district is located extend the tax annually until the bonds reach maturity.
60. The foregoing requirements, paragraphs 57-59, to issue life safety bonds were not followed and, therefore, the bonds issued by the school district conflict with the Illinois Constitution of 1970, Article VII, Section 8 which provides: “[S]chool districts . . . which exercise limited governmental powers in respect to limited governmental subjects . . . shall have only powers as granted by law”.
61. Unless the school districts actions in issuing life safety bonds are declared
invalid by judgment of this Court, and unless the County Clerks of Jersey and Greene Counties are restrained and enjoined from further extending levies to pay for these bonds, Plaintiffs and the other taxpayers of the State of Illinois will suffer great loss and irreparable damages.

Page 10 of 1
62. In summary, defendant County Clerks should be permanently enjoined from
extending any additional tax levies to pay for fire prevention and safety fund bonds for the purpose
of paying for the construction of the new high school and elementary school because:
i. No order was received by the school district requiring it to construct the high school or elementary school as mandated by 105 ILCS 5/17/-2.11.

ii. The only orders that have been entered requiring the school district to do
anything were the Orders to Effect Compliance with the Health/Life Safety Code for Public Schools signed by Larry Pfeiffer, Regional Superintendent of Schools, dated November 27, 2002. See Exhibit 16.

iii. Such order only requires the school district to “make such repairs or
alterations as necessary to effect full compliance with the applicable provisions of the Health/Life Safety Code for Public Schools, or to complete the work itemized in Amendment Number 1 as approved”.

iv. 105 ILCS 5/17-2.11(b) contemplates that the estimate from the architect or engineer be initiated after the order to reconstruct and the school district received and submitted the report of the architect, David D. Pool, to the Illinois State of Board of Education before it received any order requiring it to reconstruct a new high school.

v. The effectuation of the repair recommendations for the high school and grade school do not exceed the replacement costs.

vi. The new high school and grade school are not equivalent in area and comparable in purpose and grades served as required by law.

vii. The health and life safety requirements set forth in Exhibit 2 were
submitted and approved requiring the school district to proceed with the repairs and, therefore, the subsequent survey set forth in Exhibits 8-13 were void and of no legal effect.

viii. The school district sold bonds without legal authority because the approved repair costs did not exceed the estimated replacement costs nor were the new buildings comparable in size and purpose as required by law.

ix. The approval by the school district to sell fire prevention and safety fund bonds was not in compliance with 105 ILCS 5/17-2.11, was unlawful and was a mere ploy to circumvent the referendum results on the construction of a new high school.



Page 11 of 1

63. If an injunction is not issued, the Plaintiffs, as residents and taxpayers of
Jersey County, Illinois and Greene County, Illinois, will suffer irreparable injury as the
defendant County Clerks and the Community Unit School District #100 will continue to levy taxes to pay for bonds for the construction cost of the new school buildings, the Illinois Capital Development Board will provide the remaining funding and the plaintiffs will be forced to pay the bonds to build the high school and elementary school contrary to the statute and contrary to the will of the voters of Jersey County, Illinois and Greene County, Illinois.
64. The plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law in that the tax protest remedy would require individual suits annually for the life of the bonds, the individual tax payments are not large enough to justify such action annually; and, because no remedy, except an injunction will halt defendant County Clerks and the Community Unit School District #100 from extending tax levies to pay for fire prevention and safety bonds to pay for the construction of the high school and elementary school or prohibit them from levying taxes to pay for the bonds issued for this purpose.
65. Because the county clerks named herein have already began to assess
property taxes to pay for the bonds, no demand has been made upon them to bring suit for the relief requested herein in their names or on behalf of the taxpayers which, in any case, would be futile.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, Jeffrey D. Ferguson, Ron Floyd, Woody Goforth, Harold Kallal, Gary Krueger, Robert Ruland, Leland Snyders and Marilyn J. Woolsey, on their own behalf and on behalf of all other taxpayers in and of Jersey County and Greene County and the State of Illinois, similarly situated, request:
Page 12 of 1
(a) that this Court by its judgment, declare that the issuance of the life safety bonds
(b) referred to herein was and is unconstitutional and void;
(c) that James H. Whiteside, Superintendent of the Community Unit
School District #100 and Defendants Linda J. Crochett, Circuit Clerk of Jersey County and Deborah Banghart, Circuit Clerk of Greene County, and the Community Unit School District #100, their agents, employees, representatives and successors be temporarily and permanently enjoined from further extending and/or levying property taxes to pay for life safety bonds issued to construct the new Jersey County high school and/or elementary school; and
(d) any other relief in the premises the Court deems equitable and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
ANDERSON & GILBERT

________________________ __________________________
Rod Pitts, #02215756 Francis X. Duda, #3126744
The Law Offices of Rod Pitts Fortis M. Lawder, #1592483
200 No. Wood River Avenue 515 Olive Street, Suite 704
Wood River, IL 62095 St. Louis, MO 63101
(618) 251-3300 (314) 721-2777
(618) 251-3358 (Fax (314) 721-3515 (Fax)


Attorneys for Plaintiffs

movingbeyondcongestion.org

For immediate release

July 25, 2006


CONTACT: Diane Palmer, Director of Communications, RTA, 312-913-3282

OVER 100 PARTNERS GATHER TO LAUNCH PROJECT TO IMPROVE AND EXPAND TRANSIT IN NORTHEAST ILLINOIS
Status quo for transit funding is not sustainable

Chicago – Moving Beyond Congestion – that was the theme for a precedent-setting coalition of over 100 diverse partners representing Northeast Illinois that gathered today at Union Station to announce a new project to improve and expand transit throughout the region. Moving Beyond Congestion was launched with a collaboration of leaders from government, business, labor, education, tourism, cultural institutions and community organizations.

Road congestion is a severe and growing threat to economic prosperity in Illinois, costing residents more than $4.2 billion each year. This averages out to a $976 per rush hour traveler “congestion tax” resulting in wasted work hours and fuel consumption. “The proven solution to reducing the cost of road congestion is transit, as the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) system currently saves the region $1.6 billion annually.

But unfortunately, current transit resources are not growing fast enough to keep pace with ridership demands,” said Jim Reilly, RTA Chairman who hosted today’s press conference and facilitated a Partners for Transit meeting immediately afterward. He explained that all three service boards have used capital funds for operating expenses to make ends meet. “This practice is not sustainable and certainly not a recipe for growth,” he warned.

The RTA is spearheading Moving Beyond Congestion in primary partnership with CTA, Metra commuter rail service and Pace suburban bus and paratransit service. The RTA provides funding, planning and fiscal oversight for the transit service boards with combined capital assets of $27 billion. The public transit service region includes Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will Counties.

The priorities for Moving Beyond Congestion are to solve the current transit funding challenge, ensure financial viability and accountability and to meet the region’s growing and changing transportation needs.

DuPage County Board Chairman Robert Schillerstrom said, “How we approach, develop, govern and fund public transit will define our region’s economic future for decades to come. It is vital that we make the right choices.”

– MORE –


2 MOVING BEYOND CONGESTION

Commenting about how road congestion impacts the region’s infrastructure, Suzi Schmidt, Lake County Board Chairman said, “Traffic congestion continues to be the top factor affecting the quality of life for businesses and residents. We need to provide commuting options that help reduce congestion by giving people viable alternatives to driving.”

RTA Chairman Reilly echoed Schmidt’s comments and emphasized the importance of a strong partnership. “Virtually everyone understands that a strong, well-coordinated public transit system is good for people, good for the environment and good for business. It is equally clear that any approach that pits part of the region against others in a battle for resources is doomed to failure. Rather than argue about our differences, we must come together and focus on a shared vision and strategy for transit across the region, as evidenced by today’s gathering,” he said.

As a strategic planning initiative, Moving Beyond Congestion will involve all of the partners that convened today along with the general public. The project aims to build a bipartisan region-wide consensus for transit expansion. The vision as originally conceived but may further evolve with public input states “our vision is be a world class transportation system that is convenient, affordable, reliable and safe, and that is the keystone of the region’s growing business opportunities, thriving job market, clean air and livable communities.” Key initial steps in the strategic planning process are to assess the current system, analyze scenarios and then determine the appropriate resources that are needed to upgrade the system, said Reilly.

The vision and goals were based on the practical needs of those living in Northeast Illinois. “Our region’s residents have been telling us that they want transit to do more to address congestion problems,” said Metra Executive Director Phil Pagano. “As new residential and commercial centers continue to develop across our region, we want to work with the real estate and business community to plan and create transit services that meet their needs and reduce travel times.”

To make the point that an expanded transit network isn’t just for transit commuters, Pace Executive T.J. Ross said, “People need to realize that public transit saves them money even if they don’t use it. Just imagine what the roads would look like without us.”

All of the transit service boards agreed that the future of the region’s economy will continue to rely on public transportation. “The economic strength of Northeast Illinois is built on our transportation network,” said CTA President Frank Kruesi. “We need to maintain and expand our world-class public transportation system to support good jobs and sustainable communities,” he added.

The Moving Beyond Congestion project’s website is www.movingbeyondcongestion.org. The website is also translated into Spanish. Both transit and driving commuters are urged to visit the website to learn more about Moving Beyond Congestion and to sign up as a Partner for Transit. To learn more about Moving Beyond Congestion, e-mail movingbeyondcongestion@rtachicago.org or call (blogger)Dan Johnson-Weinberger at 312-913-3143.

– MORE –


3 MOVING BEYOND CONGESTION



Public officials or designees attending today’s Moving Beyond Congestion press conference included:

STATE LEGISLATORS
· Senator Susan Garrett
· Representative Ken Dunkin
· Angie Lobo, Office of Representative Julie Hamos
· Representative Robin Kelly
· Representative Sidney Mathias
· Representative Karen May
· Representative Kathy Ryg
· Clint Sabin, Office of House Minority Leader Tom Cross

COUNTY REPRESENTATIVES
· Tina Hill, Board Member, McHenry County Board
· Ken Kohler, Chairman, McHenry County Board
· Karen McConnaughay, Chairman, Kane County
· Matt Ryan, Chief of Staff, Will County
· Robert Schillerstrom, Chairman, DuPage County Board
· Suzi Schmidt, Chairman, Lake County Board
· David Taylor, Vice Chairman, Boone County Board

MUNICIPALITIES
· Mayor Fred Brereton, City of Belvidere
· Mayor Mike Fortner, City of West Chicago
· Melissa Hall, Management Assistant, Village of Huntley
· Patrick Higgins, Manager, Village of Western Springs
· Mayor Richard Hyde, City of Waukegan
· Mayor Al Larson, Village of Schaumburg
· Mayor Arlene Mulder, Village of Arlington Heights
· Mayor Leon Rockingham, Jr., City of North Chicago
· John Schmitt, President, Village of Algonquin
· Mayor Michael Smith, Village of New Lennox
· Mayor Ed Zabrocki, Village of Tinley Park
###

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At 9:06 PM, bored now said...

that pesky constitution just keeps getting in the way of your free-market ideals, doesn't it?

At 9:37 PM, John Ruberry said...

The same constitution that got in the way of the Maryland Wal-Mart health care law, I presume.

As for SEIU, they're the primary funder of the Wal-Mart Watch, although it's pretty hard to find any SEIU tie-in on that site.

http://www.walmartwatch.com

The United Food & Commericial Workers, whose membership is shrinking, is a little more upfront with their Wake Up Wal-Mart site.

http://www.wakeupwalmart.com

At 10:02 PM, Lovie's Leather said...

I love how the dopes come out and say things like... "that pesky constitution just keeps getting in the way of your free-market ideals, doesn't it?" Stop with this buzz-word bull crap and talk issues. If there is something in the constitution that says that I have to make $10 an hour plus $3 an hour in benefits, please Bored Now, let me know!!!

At 10:20 PM, Dave said...

If government hadn't stepped in, slavery, child labor and worse would still be part of America's workplace. With some enlightened exceptions, why would we expect most companies to do anything more for their employees other than that required by law or forced upon them by the competition with other businesses? After all, unbridled capitalism which is all the rage today makes the stockholders a company's number one priority leaving employees far behind in importance. Added to this is how outsourcing, illegal immigration and the moving of industries to other nations has removed much of the leverage employees and unions could once bring to bear on businesses. And so, if government doesn't do something, things are going to continue go to somewhere in a handbasket for the worker bees in the workplace.

As an illustration, a good friend of mine was told a few months ago that he was being let go because they could have someone from overseas do his job for less money. However, before he left, would he mind training his replacement? It's shameful how people are treated in too many companies like an expendable cog. And so, I'm cheering the vote in Chicago's City Council.

At 10:47 PM, John Ruberry said...

And GM & Ford are getting their behinds kicked by the Japanese, partly because the co.s can't afford to pay the union-mandated benefits to its workers. And the Japanese don't have 10 year-olds building cars.

At 6:56 AM, Bill Baar said...

Retailers were finally recognizing there's some money in the neigborhoods. (Check the stores by the old car barn at North and Cicero.) It will be a crime if this persaudes them the threat of meddling by local gov is enough to offset the return on their investment in the city.

It's a pain in the tail trying to do business Chicago, just as it is. Try driving a semi to make a delivery. They're too big for most city viaducts.

My friend worked at Lake and California and this becomes a complicated mapping problem you have to relay to a driver over a cell phone.

Chicago's never looked better to me but you look at the real estate and how many of those condos are being purchased as second homes, and you wonder if we aren't headed towards becoming another San Francisco. A tourist town with a great divide between wealthy and poor. Nice place to visit but no place to raise kids.

This kind of regulation is just going to accelerate that trend. Daley knows it and it's a sad day for Chicago that he couldn't carry this through...

...and that he couldn't carry is the first sign that Chicago and Democratic politics are starting to crack up.

That's long over due too, but recalling the council wars, doesn't bode well for Chicago.

At 8:58 AM, Skeeter said...

Ruberry,
You are right that Japanese companies do not have the benefits burden.
In Japan, healthcare is publicly funded so employers don't have to worry about it.
The companies there don't have to pay health care benefits.
Would you prefer that system?

At 9:06 AM, bored now said...

have you read the first amendment? you know, the right to assembly? obviously, john has a problem with the freedom of assembly, presumably because it interfers with his idea that the market should dominate. do you object to that as well, lovie? that's the issue. we all know where john stands. you can try to prevaricate like john, that's up to you!

At 9:06 AM, Bill Baar said...

Skeeter,

I would prefer something along the lines of what Romney is doing in Mass.

Walmart is right when they say they don't want to be a benefits company.

It's a mess our health care financing is coupled to employment.

I'd take Mass one step further and make it illegal for employers to offer a health care benefit. (if we can do that legally).

They'd have to give you the cash and people then required to purchase the plan that suits their needs.

We got into this whole mess with the wage/price controls during WW2 when business evaded them by giving workers insurance instead.

At 9:08 AM, steve schnorf said...

Ah, the healthcare benefits in Japan are free, huh? That's good. How can I get some of those? Oh, pay more taxes so government can pay for "free" health care. Sounds kinda circular to me.


Skeeter said...

Schnorf,
Did I use the word "free." You might want to respond to what is written.

Answering further, please provide a real response, or keep quiet.

Ford cannot compete on price with Toyota because Ford must pay health insurance costs. Toyota does not.

Apparently you are happy with that result.

1:20 PM
Anonymous said...

And why does Ford have to pay health insurance costs? Because its mandated in the union contracts!

4:52 PM
Skeeter said...

Anon 4:52,

That doesn't answer the question.
If Ford doesn't supply the health insurance and the government doesn't, who will?

Is your solution to deny the worker's health insurance or make them pay for it themselves?

Do you have any idea what it would cost for health insurance if you are not obtaining it through a group plan that employers have?

At least Baar offered some reasonable solution. The rest of you seem intent on just denying health care to most Americans.

4:56 PM
Carlos said...

Cal, you're being misleading here:

"Just the signature of the CEO on a piece of paper and all of the designated health care employees would be dues paying members."

In both of the cases of child care workers and hospital workers, the unions still have to get a majority of the workers to agree to be represented by them.

The only thing the "signature" does is agree that whoever gets the majority of cards will be recognized as the bargaining representative.

In the case of a private employer like a hospital, it can also mean that the employer agrees to remain nuetral and not interfere in employees' choice, something that too often means harassment and illegal firing (i'm link straight to afl-cio because i don't think there's bias-free view on this).

This is a longer argument, but the short response to your claim that unions are using government, is that unions are trying to get government to do what they've failed to do: protect workers' rights to associate and negotiate collectively.

4:58 PM

At 8:48 PM, Anonymous said...

so, when unions use political pressure to get things for workers, that's evil? but when corporations use lobbyists to get protective tariffs, tax breaks, relocation incentives, "liability reforms", etc., to benefit their shareholders, that's just peachy? why the double standard?

At 10:20 PM, steve schnorf said...

If economic theory is correct, the wages Toyota pays in Japan reflect the taxes the employees and/or employers have to pay government so government can pay for health care for the workers. Tax the employee less, they don't demand wages so high. Tax the employer less, they have more profit to devote to wages. I do agree that, done right, publically funded health care probably distibutes the costs differently than our current system. That's why all but the lowest earners in this country pay taxes to help pay for medicaid.

At 11:51 PM, Dignan said...

Jon Burge is doing security consulting for Walmart.
Shoplifting is down and so is employee theft.

At 6:54 AM, JB Powers said...

Anon 6:48

When unions use political pressure to get things for workers, it creates inefficiencies in the market.

When corporations use lobbyists to get protective tariffs, tax breaks, relocation incentives, to benefit their shareholders, it adds inefficiency to the market.

Neither of them are very helpful to the consumer. When people are denied the ability to spend their money as they choose, benefits are given to a politically protected group, be it business or workers vs. the whole of society. Bad decisions tend to be made, and the link is broken between legitimate work, competition, and financial success.

At 7:21 AM, bored now said...

jb: you write as if there are no existing inefficiencies in the market! don't be silly. even if markets could theoretically be efficient, reality is that very, very few are. yes, the constitutional protections add to the inefficiencies of the market, but so what? corporations that do not want to do business under our constitution are free to conduct their business elsewhere. corporations already have huge advantages in the marketplace and the political system which they exploit; it's kind of silly to get upset about the small number of advantages their employees might try to exploit...

At 7:54 AM, Anonymous said...

It seems that we've forgotten that the economy is not an end in itself. We don't work to create a rational or efficient economy according to the theoretical dictates of economists. Instead, we work to make a living and to provide for ourselves and our families. If the economy fails to do this, then we need to rethink the rules. As an illustration, companies are now encouraged to pay their employees as little as possible so that they can provide the maximum return to stockholders. Are we really better off as a society or nation when stockholders are king and their interests trump everyone else's? I don't think so. We rejected the divine right of kings politcally a long time ago and it's time to do the same in economics. We have to decide whether Wall Street or Main Street runs this country.


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