More McHenry County Blog

SCOTT A. MILLIMAN, SR., ┐
│
Plaintiff, │
│
v. ├ NO.
│
COUNTY OF MCHENRY, Corporation and Body Politic, │
KEITH NYGREN, Individually and in his official capacity │
as SHERIFF OF MCHENRY COUNTY, │
UNDERSHERIFF ANDREW J. ZINKE, COMMANDER │
JOHN L. MILLER, BRYAN KRAUSE, SGT. STEVEN │
SCHMITT and LT. KEN NIELSON, │ JURY DEMANDED
│
Defendants. ┘


Now comes the plaintiff, Scott A. Milliman, Sr., and complains of the defendants, County of McHenry, Keith Nygren, Undersheriff Andrew J. Zinke, Commander John L. Miller, Bryan Krause, Sgt. Steven Schmitt and Lt. Ken Nielson as follows:


1. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C., §1983 in that plaintiff has been deprived of his rights secured by The United States Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C., §§ 1331, 1343 and 2201. Venue lies in the Western Division of the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C., § 1391, because relevant acts occurred within this district and the parties reside in this district.


2. Plaintiff was a sworn law enforcement officer employed by the defendant, County of McHenry, in the position of Deputy Sheriff, from his hire in 1997 until his unlawful termination. At all relevant times hereto plaintiff had the right to freedom of speech and freedom of association as guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

3. The County of McHenry is a duly constituted body politic, located within the Western Division of the Northern District of Illinois. McHenry is the employer and principal of the individual defendants. At all relevant times hereto the individual defendants were acting under color of state law, ordinance and/or regulations, statutes, custom and usages of McHenry and the Sheriff of McHenry County.

4. Nygren is, at all relevant times hereto, the Sheriff of McHenry County. At all relevant times hereto Nygren was acting under color of state law and in the capacity of the highest ranking official in the McHenry County Sheriff’s Department. He is sued in his official and individual capacity.

5. Commander John L. Miller, Bryan Krause, Sgt. Steven Schmitt and Lt. Ken Nielson at all relevant times hereto were employees of defendant McHenry and acting under color of state law. They are sued in their official and individual capacities.


6. On November 23, 2010 Milliman testified in a deposition in the case Seipler v. Cundiff, 08 C 50257, a case alleging that the plaintiff had been and was being retaliated against as a result of his complaints of other deputy sheriffs engaging in racial profiling. During the deposition Milliman gave sworn testimony concerning the following matters:

(a) Excessive force used by McHenry County Deputy Sheriffs;

(b) Retaliation suffered by Milliman and other deputy sheriffs for reporting unlawful conduct of other deputy sheriffs;

(c) Allegations that Nygren was directly involved in ticket fixing in McHenry County;

(d) Nygren’s acceptance of bribes intended to influence his actions as Sheriff;

(e) Nygren’s involvement in a scheme to fraudulently procure SBA loans for individuals and share in the proceeds of the loans knowing that the loans were going to default;

(f) Milliman’s cooperation with the FBI investigation into corruption in McHenry County;

(g) Evidence of racial profiling by McHenry County Deputy Sheriffs;

(h) General corruption within the McHenry County Sheriff’s Office;

7. Immediately after Milliman’s deposition testimony Schmitt, Milliman’s direct supervisor, Miller and Nielsen wrote false reports critical of Milliman in order to provide a basis for Milliman’s termination.

8. Defendant Nygren provided a copy of Milliman’s deposition to one or more individuals in violation of a federal court order.

9. Shortly after his deposition Nygren removed Milliman from active duty and placed him on administrative leave in retaliation for his testimony at the November, 2010 deposition. On December 23, 2010 Miller stripped Milliman of his badge and Sheriff’s Deputy identification.

10. Milliman was forced to use vacation days and sick days in order to receive pay.

11. Nygren forced Milliman to undergo psychological testing in retaliation for his truthful deposition testimony. Miller on more than one occasion contacted the psychologist conducting the psychological testing and provided false, negative information about Milliman in order to influence the outcome of the testing.

12. Prior to the psychological testing of plaintiff defendants Miller and Nygren provided the psychologist with a copy of Milliman’s deposition, in direct violation of an April 7, 2009 protective order, in an attempt to negatively influence the outcome of the psychological testing.

13. Immediately prior to Milliman’s deposition, in an attempt to intimidate him and thereby influence his testimony, Krause took away Milliman’s squad car and replaced it with an old, unsafe, dysfunctional squad car.

14. On April 4, 2011, without any lawful basis, Nielsen ordered Milliman to return his uniform and all law enforcement equipment in his possession to McHenry, under threat of disciplinary action.

15. On April 18, 2011 Lutz, Schmitt and Nielsen seized and took personal items from Milliman in retaliation for his testimony and in an attempt to provoke Milliman.

16. On May 5, 2011 Milliman filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Chicago office of the EEOC alleging that he was being retaliated against by the McHenry County Sheriff’s Department.

17. In July of 2011 Milliman filed an Amended Charge of Discrimination with the Chicago office of the EEOC against by the McHenry County Sheriff’s Department alleging both retaliation and discrimination based upon a perceived disability.

18. In early August of 2011 defendant Zinke met with Milliman and told him that his deposition testimony had violated the general orders of the Sheriff’s Department and that he would be seeking Milliman’s termination.

19. On August 17, 2011 Nygren terminated Milliman’s employment with the McHenry
County Sheriff’s Department in retaliation for Milliman’s deposition testimony, EEOC charges and association with Zane Seipler.

20 As a direct and proximate result of the actions taken by the defendants as described above, the plaintiff has suffered lost wages and suffered other economic loss.

21. As a direct and proximate result of the actions taken by the defendants as described above, the plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer extreme mental anguish, embarrassment and emotional distress.


1-21. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 21 as if fully set forth here.

22. As described above, plaintiff exercised his right to freedom of speech

23. Plaintiff’s actions constitute speech on matters of public concern and, therefore, plaintiff’s speech is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

24. As a result of plaintiff’s protected speech the defendants retaliated against plaintiff by engaging in the conduct described in paragraphs 7-12, 14-15 and 18.

25. As a direct and proximate result of the actions taken by defendants as described above, the plaintiff has suffered a chilling effect upon the exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and has suffered harm and injury.

26. At all relevant times, defendant’s actions were willful, wanton, intentional and malicious. Punitive damages should be awarded in order to punish and deter such conduct.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that this Court will grant the following relief:

A. A preliminary and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from continuing to violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff including reinstatement to his position as a Deputy Sheriff;

B. Judgment for compensatory damages in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants in an amount in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00);

C. Judgment for punitive damages in favor of the plaintiff and against the individual defendants in an amount to be determined by the jury.

D. An award for reasonable costs and attorney's fees as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

E. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just.


1-21. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 21 as if fully set forth here.

22. A described above, plaintiff exercised his right to freedom of association.

22. Plaintiff’s actions constitute association on matters of public concern and, therefore, plaintiff’s acts are protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution.

23. As a result of plaintiff’s exercising his protected right to association the defendants retaliated against plaintiff by engaging in the conduct described in paragraphs 7-12, 14-15 and 18.

24. As a direct and proximate result of the actions taken by defendants as described above, the plaintiff has suffered a chilling effect upon the exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of association and has suffered harm and injury.

25. At all relevant times, defendant’s actions were willful, wanton, intentional and malicious. Punitive damages should be awarded in order to punish and deter such conduct.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that this Court will grant the following relief:

A. A preliminary and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from continuing to violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff including reinstatement to his position as a Deputy Sheriff;

B. Judgment for compensatory damages in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants in an amount in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00);

C. Judgment for punitive damages in favor of the plaintiff and against the individual
defendants in an amount to be determined by the jury.

D. An award for reasonable costs and attorney's fees as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

E. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just.


1-21. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 21 as if fully set forth here.

22. At all relevant times hereto defendants Nygren, Miller, Krause, Schmitt and Nielson
intentionally worked together for the common plan and purpose of harming the plaintiff as described above, and otherwise injure him.

23. At all relevant times, defendant’s actions were willful, wanton, intentional and
malicious. Punitive damages should be awarded in order to punish and deter such conduct.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment in her favor and against defendants in an amount in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00), plus punitive damages and costs.

COUNT IV–745 ILCS 10/9-102–State Law Claim

-21. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 21 as if fully set forth here.

22. At all relevant times hereto there existed a certain Illinois statute, to wit, 745 ILCS 10/9-102, which stated in pertinent part:

A local public entity is empowered and directed to pay any tort judgment or settlement for compensatory damages (and may pay any associated attorney’s fees and costs) for which it or an employee while acting within the scope of his employment is liable in the manner provided in this Article.

23. The defendant McHenry County is required by Illinois law to pay any judgment entered against any of the defendants.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment in his favor and against defendant McHenry County in an amount in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00), plus costs and attorney’s fees.
________________________________
Thomas C. Crooks,
Attorney for Plaintiff
RULE 38 JURY DEMAND

Pursuant to Rule 38 the Plaintiff demands trial by jury for all claims triable by jury.

Thomas C. Crooks
Attorney at Law
Three First National Plaza Suite 1950
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Telephone: 312-641-2260
Facsimile: 312-641-5220