Monday, May 07, 2012
Request for Summary Judgement by Fr. Thomas Virto in $150,000 Loan Repayment Case
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Now Comes the Plaintiff, Fr. Thomas Vitro, By and through his attorney Robert T.
Hanlon with his Reply in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment and states as follows:
Introduction:
Defendants entire reply (unsupported by Affidavit) is fraught with numerous problems.
Most notably a lack of veracity. Specifically, the Defendant alleges that there are several omissions in Plaintiff’s motion which are not true. Specifically, Defendant claims the Motion for Summary Judgment was not supported by Affidavit. It was and a copy of the Motion for Summary Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit A, see last two pages – Affidavit of Fr. Vitro.
Defendant further complains that the motion does not set forth the uncontested facts. This too is false. See paragraphs 11 and 12 of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant’s arguments are without any merit.
Defendant attempts to cloud the issues in this case by setting forth an argument related to an intended third party beneficiary type claim arising under the Marital Settlement Agreement.
However, this complaint does not arise from the MSA, rather it sounds in the contract executed by Defendant agreeing to repay Plaintiff $150,000.00 plus interest at prime plus 1%. Plaintiff points to the evidence (sworn statements under oath, subject to cross-examination and subsequent acknowledgement of the debt) as indicia the existence of the existing contract and the amount actually lent to the Defendant by the Plaintiff pursuant to the contract arising under the note by and between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Plaintiff does not seek a remedy as an intended third party beneficiary of the Marital Settlement Agreement. Rather, the Marital Settlement Agreement and the prove-up thereof are evidence of the contract and Defendant’s liability under the contract as well as a basis for Judicial Estoppels and Collateral Estoppel. [Emphasis added.]
There is no genuine issue of material fact. The undisputed Facts in Support of Motion forSummary Judgment are as follows:
1) Defendant delivered to Thomas Vitro a Note for $150,000.00. See Affidavit ofThomas Vitro in ¶ 7 and Exhibit A to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
2) Thomas Vitro loaned to the Defendant $150,000.00. See Affidavit of Thomas Vitro in
¶ 3 and MSA and Prove-up testimony from Defendant’s divorce case.
3) Defendant acknowledged the Debt in a judicial proceeding. See prove-up and Marital Settlement Agreement.
4) Defendant made periodic payments on the note. See Affidavit of Thomas Vitro.
5) The Note has not been paid and has an outstanding balance of $171,594.10, as of the Date of Father Vitro’s affidavit. Id.
6) Defendant came into court and acknowledged the debt to Father Vitro in the amount of $150,000. See Marital Settlement Agreement and Prove-up document.
Within Section II of the Defendant’s response, entitled “MATERIAL FACTS ARE AT ISSUE” defendant argues that the following facts are at issue: 1) who signed the note, 2)whether the alleged note has been paid and 3) whether the defendant is in breach. See page 5 of Defendant’s Response.
Addressing each of these allegations from Section II in turn, first, Defendant has acknowledged the debt in open court and any claim that it is not her debt is nothing more than a delay tactic. The claim does not require proof of the person who signed the note. Moreover no affidavit has been asserted claiming that the Defendant did not sign the note. Additionally, Thomas Vitro’s affidavit shows that the Defendant delivered the note to him. Thus Fr. Vitro met his burden and the Defendant failed to meet her burden. Whether the Defendant delivered a copy or the original is of no consequence because the defendant tendered the note to Fr. Vitro and later acknowledged the debt.
Second, Thomas Vitro provided his affidavit that demonstrates that he received periodic payments and then has not been paid on the note and the balance due as of the date of his affidavit was $171,594.10. There is no contrary affidavit, nothing to suggest that the note has been paid. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact only claim unsupported by fact and Third, the breach is established by non-payment of the Note which is reflected in the affidavit of Thomas Vitro. Hence, the entire position of the Defendant with respect to the breach of contract claim is at best a red herring, at worst the claim was interposed for purposes of delay.
Counsel of the Defendant was present in open court and represented her in her divorce action where Defendant represented that the debt was a real debt owed by her to Fr. Vitro. Fr. Vitro has offered his affidavit which supports the position that he lent the money, was delivered the note, and was not paid. No contrary evidence was advanced by Defendant.
Attorney Hanlon’s 137 Warning
Prior to filing of the Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Attorney Hanlon sent to Attorney Wakeman an e-mail which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit B. Within Exhibit B is the following paragraph:
I would also like to inform you that I believe the Answer filed with the court is not only contrary to fact it is inconsistent with your client’s representation to the Court in her divorce case. Prove up attached.
That combined with her written admissions in the written record there as well as a copy of the prove-up where your client has admitted to owing the money to Fr. Vitro all militate to her falsely pleading in this case in violation of Rule 137. This is a fairly straightforward case and I find it unfortunate that your client is taking the positions that she is in light of the vast wealth of the family and her prior sworn statements.
I have attached them and I cordially ask that you have your client file an amended answer or answer the amended complaint truthfully. It appears to me the answer to Mr. Cuda’s draft was interposed merely
as a delay tactic and was verified with the full knowledge of the nature of the claim against her, its still a lie to say you lack sufficient information when there is an abundance of documents that has her
admitting otherwise. As such, I believe absent your amendment to the answer by then, that sanctions will be in order.
There has been no response from Ms. Wakeman to the e-mail attached as Exhibit C.
However, the interposition of the allegations in the response were nothing more than an attempt to interfer with the rights of the Plaintiff and to unnecessarily cause delay in this case. Plaintiff
will address this matter in a subsequent motion for sanctions.
THE LAW OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.
Defendant mistakenly claims that the marital settlement agreement and prove-up documents were introduced for the purpose of claiming a contract claim under a theory of a third party beneficiary. This, the Defendant is most surly incorrect about. Plaintiff clearly seeks enforcement of his contract with Ms. Sanflippo as a direct obligation, not under some perverted theory as a third party beneficiary claim. Fr. Vitro brought suit on a contract instrument attached to the complaint. Fr. Vitro seeks enforcement of the contract. While it is true that Fr. Vitro’s pleadings incorporate the evidence of the contract being the Marital Settlement Agreement and the Divorce Prove-up documents, these documents support the existence of the contract and support Plaintiff’s claims under the contract as shown below.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel “promote[s] the truth and * * * protect [s] the integrity of the court system by preventing litigants from deliberately shifting positions to suit the exigencies of the moment.” Bidani v. Lewis, 285 Ill.App.3d 545, 550 (1996). Judicial estoppel is “flexible” but five elements are “generally necessary”: “(1) the two positions must be taken by the sameparty; (2) the positions must be taken in judicial proceedings; (3) the positions must be given under oath; (4) the party must have successfully maintained the first position and received some benefit; and (5) the two positions must be totally inconsistent.” Id. “Judicial estoppel applies to statements of fact and not to legal opinions or conclusions.” Maniez v. Citibank, F.S.B., 404 Ill.App.3d 941, 949 (2010). See also: Moy v. Ng, 371 Ill.App.3d 957, 962 (2007) and Giannini v. Kumho Tire U.S.A., Inc. 385 Ill.App.3d 1013, 898 N.E.2d 1095 Ill.App. 2 Dist.,2008, Boelkes v. Harlem Consol. School Dist. No. 122, 363 Ill.App.3d 551, 842 N.E.2d 790 Ill.App. 2 Dist.,2006.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel rests upon public policy which upholds the sanctity of the oath and its purpose is to bar as evidence statements and declarations which would be contrary to sworn testimony the party has given in the same or previous judicial proceedings. Id.
In this case, the Defendant seeks to invalidate the claim of the existence of the debt to Fr.Vitro claiming that a genuine issue of fact exists with respect to the signature on the note, whether or not the note has been paid and whether or not there was a breach. It is clear that the elements of judicial estoppels have been met in this case. This is because of the following points:
A) The position taken here is taken by the same person, Lisa Ann Sanflippo (F.K.A.Lisa Ann Evon);
B) the statements made by Lisa Sanflippo were made in judicial proceedings,
C) the statements were under oath (prove-up incorporating MSA, and 11.02 Statement); D)the Defendant successfully maintained that position and received her divorce decree and MSA from the Court, and
E) the two positions taken by the Defendant are totally inconsistent. It is implausible that the Defendant can walk into this Court and claim that she has a debt to Fr.Vitro and then turn around and claim that she owes no debt in a separate proceeding to collect that debt. The inconsistencies between claiming a debt and then asserting a defect in the debt is totally inconsistent warranting the invocation of the doctrine of Judicial Estoppel. Although, Defendant provides absolutely no evidence to support that the note upon which the Plaintiff claims has a defect. The Defendant offered no evidence in support of the proposition that the she either did not sign or that she paid the note. Had she offered such evidence, it would still be inadmissible under the doctrine of Judicial Estoppel and the authority cited above. Nevertheless, Defendant makes no such assertion.
Collateral estoppel, an equitable doctrine, applies “when the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the current action, there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication, and the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party to, or in privity with a party to, the prior adjudication.” Du Page Forklift Service, Inc. v. Material Handling Services, Inc., 195 Ill.2d 71, 81 (2001). Collateral estoppel “may generally apply to prior determinations of law.” Id. at 80.
Here, the Court determined Defendant’s debts in the divorce proceeding ostensibly because Defendant indicated the debt to Fr. Vitro was in fact her debt. If the debt was not due and owning, she could have asserted that position in the separate case of Evon v Evon. Nevertheless, Lisa Ann Sanflippo, F.K.A. Lisa Ann Evon failed to assert any claim that the debt was not her debt. Rather, she breached the contractual obligations and waited for Fr. Vitro to assert his claims in this action to now allege that somehow she does not owe the debt. It is too late for Defendant to play these continued games. It is time for this Court to order Lisa Ann Sanflippo to pay the priest (Fr. Thomas Vitro) whom lent her $150,000 plus interest and costs of collection including his attorney fees.
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
The law does not require that there be no issues of fact, rather the law requires that there be no “Genuine” issues of material fact. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c).
The burden of proof and the initial burden of production in a motion for summary judgment lie with the movant. Kajima Construction Services, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 227 Ill.2d 102, 106, 316 Ill.Dec. 238, 879 N.E.2d 305, 308 (2007); see 735 ILCS5/2–1005 (Where the facts could lead a fair-minded person to draw more than one conclusion or inference, summary judgment must be denied.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Evans v. Brown, 399 Ill.App.3d 238, 243, 339 Ill.Dec. 144, 925 N.E.2d 1265, 1271 (2010). If the defendant raises an affirmative defense and establishes his factual position with supporting documents, the Plaintiff must present a factual basis arguably entitling him to a judgment. Id. at 244, 339 Ill.Dec. 144, 925 N.E.2d at 1271.
In this case, Plaintiff established the following facts that entitle him to judgment:
1) Defendant delivered to Thomas Vitro a Note for $150,000.00. See Affidavit of Thomas Vitro in ¶ 7 and Exhibit A to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
2) Thomas Vitro loaned to the Defendant $150,000.00. See Affidavit of Thomas Vitro in ¶ 3 and MSA and Prove-up testimony from Defendant’s divorce case.
3) Defendant acknowledged the Debt in a judicial proceeding. See prove-up and Marital Settlement Agreement.
4) Defendant made periodic payments on the note. See Affidavit of Thomas Vitro.
5) The Note has not been paid and has an outstanding balance of $171,594.10, as of the Date of Father Vitro’s affidavit. Id.
6) Defendant came into court and acknowledged the debt to Father Vitro in the amount of $150,000. See Marital Settlement Agreement and Prove-up document.
Wherefore, the Plaintiff prays that this court grant him summary judgment as there is no Genuine Issue of Material Fact that would create a bar to entry of judgment in this cause.
Respectfully submitted,
By:_____________________________ Robert Hanlon
Now Comes the Plaintiff, Fr. Thomas Vitro, By and through his attorney Robert T.
Hanlon with his Reply in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment and states as follows:
Introduction:
Defendants entire reply (unsupported by Affidavit) is fraught with numerous problems.
Most notably a lack of veracity. Specifically, the Defendant alleges that there are several omissions in Plaintiff’s motion which are not true. Specifically, Defendant claims the Motion for Summary Judgment was not supported by Affidavit. It was and a copy of the Motion for Summary Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit A, see last two pages – Affidavit of Fr. Vitro.
Defendant further complains that the motion does not set forth the uncontested facts. This too is false. See paragraphs 11 and 12 of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant’s arguments are without any merit.
Defendant attempts to cloud the issues in this case by setting forth an argument related to an intended third party beneficiary type claim arising under the Marital Settlement Agreement.
However, this complaint does not arise from the MSA, rather it sounds in the contract executed by Defendant agreeing to repay Plaintiff $150,000.00 plus interest at prime plus 1%. Plaintiff points to the evidence (sworn statements under oath, subject to cross-examination and subsequent acknowledgement of the debt) as indicia the existence of the existing contract and the amount actually lent to the Defendant by the Plaintiff pursuant to the contract arising under the note by and between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Plaintiff does not seek a remedy as an intended third party beneficiary of the Marital Settlement Agreement. Rather, the Marital Settlement Agreement and the prove-up thereof are evidence of the contract and Defendant’s liability under the contract as well as a basis for Judicial Estoppels and Collateral Estoppel. [Emphasis added.]
There is no genuine issue of material fact. The undisputed Facts in Support of Motion forSummary Judgment are as follows:
1) Defendant delivered to Thomas Vitro a Note for $150,000.00. See Affidavit ofThomas Vitro in ¶ 7 and Exhibit A to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
2) Thomas Vitro loaned to the Defendant $150,000.00. See Affidavit of Thomas Vitro in
¶ 3 and MSA and Prove-up testimony from Defendant’s divorce case.
3) Defendant acknowledged the Debt in a judicial proceeding. See prove-up and Marital Settlement Agreement.
4) Defendant made periodic payments on the note. See Affidavit of Thomas Vitro.
5) The Note has not been paid and has an outstanding balance of $171,594.10, as of the Date of Father Vitro’s affidavit. Id.
6) Defendant came into court and acknowledged the debt to Father Vitro in the amount of $150,000. See Marital Settlement Agreement and Prove-up document.
Within Section II of the Defendant’s response, entitled “MATERIAL FACTS ARE AT ISSUE” defendant argues that the following facts are at issue: 1) who signed the note, 2)whether the alleged note has been paid and 3) whether the defendant is in breach. See page 5 of Defendant’s Response.
Addressing each of these allegations from Section II in turn, first, Defendant has acknowledged the debt in open court and any claim that it is not her debt is nothing more than a delay tactic. The claim does not require proof of the person who signed the note. Moreover no affidavit has been asserted claiming that the Defendant did not sign the note. Additionally, Thomas Vitro’s affidavit shows that the Defendant delivered the note to him. Thus Fr. Vitro met his burden and the Defendant failed to meet her burden. Whether the Defendant delivered a copy or the original is of no consequence because the defendant tendered the note to Fr. Vitro and later acknowledged the debt.
Second, Thomas Vitro provided his affidavit that demonstrates that he received periodic payments and then has not been paid on the note and the balance due as of the date of his affidavit was $171,594.10. There is no contrary affidavit, nothing to suggest that the note has been paid. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact only claim unsupported by fact and Third, the breach is established by non-payment of the Note which is reflected in the affidavit of Thomas Vitro. Hence, the entire position of the Defendant with respect to the breach of contract claim is at best a red herring, at worst the claim was interposed for purposes of delay.
Counsel of the Defendant was present in open court and represented her in her divorce action where Defendant represented that the debt was a real debt owed by her to Fr. Vitro. Fr. Vitro has offered his affidavit which supports the position that he lent the money, was delivered the note, and was not paid. No contrary evidence was advanced by Defendant.
Attorney Hanlon’s 137 Warning
Prior to filing of the Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Attorney Hanlon sent to Attorney Wakeman an e-mail which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit B. Within Exhibit B is the following paragraph:
I would also like to inform you that I believe the Answer filed with the court is not only contrary to fact it is inconsistent with your client’s representation to the Court in her divorce case. Prove up attached.
That combined with her written admissions in the written record there as well as a copy of the prove-up where your client has admitted to owing the money to Fr. Vitro all militate to her falsely pleading in this case in violation of Rule 137. This is a fairly straightforward case and I find it unfortunate that your client is taking the positions that she is in light of the vast wealth of the family and her prior sworn statements.
I have attached them and I cordially ask that you have your client file an amended answer or answer the amended complaint truthfully. It appears to me the answer to Mr. Cuda’s draft was interposed merely
as a delay tactic and was verified with the full knowledge of the nature of the claim against her, its still a lie to say you lack sufficient information when there is an abundance of documents that has her
admitting otherwise. As such, I believe absent your amendment to the answer by then, that sanctions will be in order.
There has been no response from Ms. Wakeman to the e-mail attached as Exhibit C.
However, the interposition of the allegations in the response were nothing more than an attempt to interfer with the rights of the Plaintiff and to unnecessarily cause delay in this case. Plaintiff
will address this matter in a subsequent motion for sanctions.
THE LAW OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.
Defendant mistakenly claims that the marital settlement agreement and prove-up documents were introduced for the purpose of claiming a contract claim under a theory of a third party beneficiary. This, the Defendant is most surly incorrect about. Plaintiff clearly seeks enforcement of his contract with Ms. Sanflippo as a direct obligation, not under some perverted theory as a third party beneficiary claim. Fr. Vitro brought suit on a contract instrument attached to the complaint. Fr. Vitro seeks enforcement of the contract. While it is true that Fr. Vitro’s pleadings incorporate the evidence of the contract being the Marital Settlement Agreement and the Divorce Prove-up documents, these documents support the existence of the contract and support Plaintiff’s claims under the contract as shown below.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel “promote[s] the truth and * * * protect [s] the integrity of the court system by preventing litigants from deliberately shifting positions to suit the exigencies of the moment.” Bidani v. Lewis, 285 Ill.App.3d 545, 550 (1996). Judicial estoppel is “flexible” but five elements are “generally necessary”: “(1) the two positions must be taken by the sameparty; (2) the positions must be taken in judicial proceedings; (3) the positions must be given under oath; (4) the party must have successfully maintained the first position and received some benefit; and (5) the two positions must be totally inconsistent.” Id. “Judicial estoppel applies to statements of fact and not to legal opinions or conclusions.” Maniez v. Citibank, F.S.B., 404 Ill.App.3d 941, 949 (2010). See also: Moy v. Ng, 371 Ill.App.3d 957, 962 (2007) and Giannini v. Kumho Tire U.S.A., Inc. 385 Ill.App.3d 1013, 898 N.E.2d 1095 Ill.App. 2 Dist.,2008, Boelkes v. Harlem Consol. School Dist. No. 122, 363 Ill.App.3d 551, 842 N.E.2d 790 Ill.App. 2 Dist.,2006.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel rests upon public policy which upholds the sanctity of the oath and its purpose is to bar as evidence statements and declarations which would be contrary to sworn testimony the party has given in the same or previous judicial proceedings. Id.
In this case, the Defendant seeks to invalidate the claim of the existence of the debt to Fr.Vitro claiming that a genuine issue of fact exists with respect to the signature on the note, whether or not the note has been paid and whether or not there was a breach. It is clear that the elements of judicial estoppels have been met in this case. This is because of the following points:
A) The position taken here is taken by the same person, Lisa Ann Sanflippo (F.K.A.Lisa Ann Evon);
B) the statements made by Lisa Sanflippo were made in judicial proceedings,
C) the statements were under oath (prove-up incorporating MSA, and 11.02 Statement); D)the Defendant successfully maintained that position and received her divorce decree and MSA from the Court, and
E) the two positions taken by the Defendant are totally inconsistent. It is implausible that the Defendant can walk into this Court and claim that she has a debt to Fr.Vitro and then turn around and claim that she owes no debt in a separate proceeding to collect that debt. The inconsistencies between claiming a debt and then asserting a defect in the debt is totally inconsistent warranting the invocation of the doctrine of Judicial Estoppel. Although, Defendant provides absolutely no evidence to support that the note upon which the Plaintiff claims has a defect. The Defendant offered no evidence in support of the proposition that the she either did not sign or that she paid the note. Had she offered such evidence, it would still be inadmissible under the doctrine of Judicial Estoppel and the authority cited above. Nevertheless, Defendant makes no such assertion.
Collateral estoppel, an equitable doctrine, applies “when the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the current action, there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication, and the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party to, or in privity with a party to, the prior adjudication.” Du Page Forklift Service, Inc. v. Material Handling Services, Inc., 195 Ill.2d 71, 81 (2001). Collateral estoppel “may generally apply to prior determinations of law.” Id. at 80.
Here, the Court determined Defendant’s debts in the divorce proceeding ostensibly because Defendant indicated the debt to Fr. Vitro was in fact her debt. If the debt was not due and owning, she could have asserted that position in the separate case of Evon v Evon. Nevertheless, Lisa Ann Sanflippo, F.K.A. Lisa Ann Evon failed to assert any claim that the debt was not her debt. Rather, she breached the contractual obligations and waited for Fr. Vitro to assert his claims in this action to now allege that somehow she does not owe the debt. It is too late for Defendant to play these continued games. It is time for this Court to order Lisa Ann Sanflippo to pay the priest (Fr. Thomas Vitro) whom lent her $150,000 plus interest and costs of collection including his attorney fees.
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
The law does not require that there be no issues of fact, rather the law requires that there be no “Genuine” issues of material fact. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c).
The burden of proof and the initial burden of production in a motion for summary judgment lie with the movant. Kajima Construction Services, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 227 Ill.2d 102, 106, 316 Ill.Dec. 238, 879 N.E.2d 305, 308 (2007); see 735 ILCS5/2–1005 (Where the facts could lead a fair-minded person to draw more than one conclusion or inference, summary judgment must be denied.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Evans v. Brown, 399 Ill.App.3d 238, 243, 339 Ill.Dec. 144, 925 N.E.2d 1265, 1271 (2010). If the defendant raises an affirmative defense and establishes his factual position with supporting documents, the Plaintiff must present a factual basis arguably entitling him to a judgment. Id. at 244, 339 Ill.Dec. 144, 925 N.E.2d at 1271.
In this case, Plaintiff established the following facts that entitle him to judgment:
1) Defendant delivered to Thomas Vitro a Note for $150,000.00. See Affidavit of Thomas Vitro in ¶ 7 and Exhibit A to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
2) Thomas Vitro loaned to the Defendant $150,000.00. See Affidavit of Thomas Vitro in ¶ 3 and MSA and Prove-up testimony from Defendant’s divorce case.
3) Defendant acknowledged the Debt in a judicial proceeding. See prove-up and Marital Settlement Agreement.
4) Defendant made periodic payments on the note. See Affidavit of Thomas Vitro.
5) The Note has not been paid and has an outstanding balance of $171,594.10, as of the Date of Father Vitro’s affidavit. Id.
6) Defendant came into court and acknowledged the debt to Father Vitro in the amount of $150,000. See Marital Settlement Agreement and Prove-up document.
Wherefore, the Plaintiff prays that this court grant him summary judgment as there is no Genuine Issue of Material Fact that would create a bar to entry of judgment in this cause.
Respectfully submitted,
By:_____________________________ Robert Hanlon
# posted by Cal Skinner : 7:09 PM
